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Responding to Normativity

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Clarendon Press. pp. 220--39 (2007)

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  1. What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  • Inquiry.R. Stalnaker - 1984 - Mind 94 (376):627-630.
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  • Practical Induction.Sarah Buss & Elijah Millgram - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):571.
    I wish more books of philosophy were like this one. It is elegantly written. It is filled with provocative claims and ingenious arguments. It is a really good read, even while it forces us to rethink many of our assumptions about practical reason and practical reasoning, morality and agency.
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  • Three Faces of Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    To desire something is a condition familiar to everyone. It is uncontroversial that desiring has something to do with motivation, something to do with pleasure, and something to do with reward. Call these "the three faces of desire." The standard philosophical theory at present holds that the motivational face of desire presents its unique essence--to desire a state of affairs is to be disposed to act so as to bring it about. A familiar but less standard account holds the hedonic (...)
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  • Motivation and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436-443.
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Mind 106 (424):791-794.
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
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  • Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 1995 - Ethics 106 (4):848-850.
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  • The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
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  • Practical Induction.Elijah Millgram - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
    Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force.
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  • Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire.Robert Audi - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):235 – 263.
    This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly Humean (...)
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  • Are There Extrinsic Desires?David K. Chan - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):326-50.
    An extrinsic desire is defined as a desire for something, not for its own sake, but for its supposed propensity to secure something else that one desires. I argue that the notion of ‘extrinsic desire’ is theoretically redundant. I begin by defining desire as a propositional attitude with a desirability characterization. The roles of desire and intention in practical reasoning are distinguished. I show that extrinsic desire does not have its own motivational role. I also show that extrinsic desire is (...)
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  • How to Argue About Practical Reason.R. Jay Wallace - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):355-385.
    How to Argue about . Bibliographic Info. Citation. How to Argue about ; Author(s): R. Jay Wallace; Source: Mind , New Series, Vol.
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  • Ways of Meaning.Martin Bell & Mark De Bretton Platts - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):164.
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  • The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
    The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...)
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  • Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ethics 96 (3):604-619.
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  • The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
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  • The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  • Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):354–379.
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  • An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.Francis Hutcheson - 1726 - New York: Garland.
    Concerning beauty, order, harmony, design.--Concerning moral good and evil.
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  • Intention.P. L. Heath & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
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  • Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics.James Lenman - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):291-301.
    My concern here is with the Humean claim that no purely cognitive state could, in combination with appropriate other beliefs, but with nothing else, originate a process of rational motivation. The starting point of such motivation must always include some other element: a desire. Let's call this claim, following David McNaughton the belief-desire theory, or BDT for short. The theory is widely believed but intensely controversial. I argue here that it is true.
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  • Reasons for Actions and Desires.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.
    It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...)
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