Afin de « sauver une existence » pour les objets dont il est question dans les représentations mathématiques, le jeune Husserl invente en 1894 une théorie des assomptions. Notre but est d’explorer cette théorie pour montrer en quoi elle constituait une alternative probante par rapport à l’ontologie réaliste et à la conception correspondantiste de la vérité. De celles-ci, pourtant, Husserl ne parviendra pas à se départir à l’époque, comme en témoigne la dichotomie qu’il opère entre la signification et la perception, (...) et c’est pourquoi il ne saura non plus tirer parti de sa propre théorie des assomptions. Elle semble pourtant refaire surface à la fin de son oeuvre, suite à la rupture avec le réalisme que marque précisément l’introduction du concept de sens ou de noème de perception.In the year 1894, Husserl introduces a theory of assumptions with the aim of « saving an existence » for the objects in mathematical representations. We want to examine this theory in order to show why it constituted a convincing alternative to a realist ontology and a correspondance conception of truth. Yet, during this period, Husserl remained attached to those positions, as the dichotomy between meaning and perception shows. It is also the reason why he does not manage to benefit from his discovery of assumptions. However, this topic seems to reappear in the last work of Husserl, following his breaking with realism, which is precisely corroborated by the emergence of the concept of a perceptual meaning or noema. (shrink)

À Denis Fisette1Dans sa préface à Methods of Logic, Quine écrivait que « si les objets physiques n’existaient pas, ils auraient dû être inventés. Ils sont indispensables à titre de communs dénominateurs publics de l’expérience sensible privée ». La plus mauvaise lecture qu’on puisse faire de ces lignes serait d’en conclure, de façon très platement réaliste, que, puisque les objets existent, nous n’avons...

Phenomenology, according to Husserl, is meant to be philosophy as rigorous science. It was Franz Brentano who inspired him to pursue the ideal of scientific philosophy. Though Husserl began his philosophical career as an orthodox disciple of Brentano, he eventually began to have doubts about this orientation. The Logische Unterschungen is the result of such doubts. Especially after the publication of that work, he became increasingly convinced that, in the interests of scientific philosophy, he had to go in a direction (...) which diverged from Brentano and other members of this school (`Brentanists') who believed in the same ideal. An attempt is made here to ascertain Husserl's philosophical relation to Brentano and certain other Brentanists (Carl Stumpf, Benno Kerry, Kasimir Twardowski, Alexius Meinong, and Anton Marty). The crucial turning point in the development of these relations is to be found in the essay which Husserl wrote in 1894 (particularly in response to Twardowski) under the title `Intentional Objects' (which is translated as an appendix in this volume). This study will be of interest to historians of philosophy and phenomenology in particular, but also to anyone concerned with the ideal of scientific philosophy. (shrink)