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  1. Mental Causation.John Heil & Alfred Mele - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (1):105-106.
    Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...)
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  • Anomalous monism.John Heil - unknown
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  • The individuation of events.Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34.
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  • Thinking causes.Donald Davidson - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 1993--3.
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  • Actions and Events, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Ernest Lepore & Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):542-544.
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  • Why having a mind matters.Mark Johnston - 1985 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
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  • Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1985 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
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  • Mind-body causation and explanatory practice.Tyler Burge - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Argument for Epiphenomenalism [I]: (A) Mental event-tokens are identical with physical event-tokens. (B) The causal powers of a physical event are determined only by its physical properties; and (C) mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
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  • On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    [Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true.
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  • Ontologies of events.Lawrence B. Lombard - 1998 - In S. Laurence C. MacDonald (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 277--294.
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  • Davidson's thinking causes.Ernest Sosa - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
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