- (1 other version)What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being.Richard Kraut - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Dear Prudence: the nature and normativity of prudential discourse.Guy Fletcher - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.details
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Needing and Necessity.Guy Fletcher - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192.details
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Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.details
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(1 other version)Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.details
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What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-being.Richard Kraut - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):576-578.details
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The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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(1 other version)Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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(1 other version)The Authority of Reason.Stephen Darwall - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):583.details
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(1 other version)The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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The Authority of Reason.Jean Hampton - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Richard Healey.details
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The Limits of Moral Authority.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.details
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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language.Stephen Finlay - 2014 - New York, US: Oup Usa.details
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(1 other version)The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.details
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.details
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The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1):1-27.details
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In defense of moral error theory.Jonas Olson - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Naturalism and Prescriptivity.Peter Railton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):151.details
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(1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.details
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(3 other versions)Deflationary normative pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.details
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Moral and epistemic open-question arguments.Chris Heathwood - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.details
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(1 other version)Too Much Morality.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.details
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Might All Normativity be Queer?Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.details
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The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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(1 other version)What is good and why: the ethics of well-being.Richard Kraut - 2007 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Reasons for action: Agent-neutral vs. Agent-relative.Michael Ridge - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Morality, schmorality.Richard Joyce - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral overridingness and moral theory.Sarah Stroud - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189.details
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(1 other version)Reasons and motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.details
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(1 other version)Moral cognitivism and motivation.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Realism and reduction: The Quest for robustness.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-18.details
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Naturalism, normativity, and the open question argument.Connie S. Rosati - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):46-70.details
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(1 other version)Moral arguments.Philippa Foot - 1958 - Mind 67 (268):502-513.details
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Why idealize?David Enoch - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):759-787.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice L. Dowell - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.details
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Moral Reason.Julia Markovits - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Error theory and reasons for belief.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Theories of welfare, theories of good reasons for action, and ontological naturalism.Brad Hooker - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (1):25-36.details
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