- Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
|
|
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
|
|
A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
|
|
Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
|
|
Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
|
|
Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oup Usa.details
|
|
The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
|
|
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
|
|
The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Sebastian Schmidt - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
|
|
The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
|
|
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
|
|
Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515-522.details
|
|
Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.details
|
|
Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
|
|
Scope for rational autonomy.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):297-310.details
|
|
Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
|
|
The puzzle of the self-torturer.Warren S. Quinn - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):79-90.details
|
|
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
|
|
The Merits of Incoherence.James Pryor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):112-141.details
|
|
Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):99-130.details
|
|
Reasons and motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.details
|
|
What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
|
|
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
|
|
Why Be Rational&quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
|
|
How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
|
|
Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
|
|
Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
|
|
A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'.Julian Fink - 2014 - Erkenntnis (4):909-941.details
|
|
Précis of Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423-428.details
|
|
Review of Jonathan Dancy: Moral Reasons. [REVIEW]Donald C. Hubin - 1995 - Ethics 106 (1):187-189.details
|
|
Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.details
|
|
Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
|
|
The scope of rational requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.details
|
|
Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
|
|
Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.details
|
|
Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.details
|
|
Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts.Jc Beall - 2013 - Noûs 49 (2):410-423.details
|
|
Weakness of will and rational action.Robert Audi - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.details
|
|
Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.details
|
|
What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
|
|