- Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Lying, misleading, and what is said: an exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Liar!Jonathan Webber - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):651-659.details
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Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.details
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Reply to Roy Sorensen, 'Knowledge-lies'.Julia Staffel - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):300-302.details
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Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.details
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Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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Better lie!Clea F. Rees - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):59-64.details
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The Lying Test.Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):470-499.details
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Rational responsibility and the assertoric character of bald-faced lies.Patrick R. Leland - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):550-554.details
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Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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Bald-faced lies: how to make a move in a language game without making a move in a conversation.Jessica Keiser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):461-477.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.details
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Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?Don Fallis - 2014 - Ratio 28 (1):81-96.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The intent to deceive.Roderick M. Chisholm & Thomas D. Feehan - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):143-159.details
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The definition of lying.Thomas L. Carson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):284–306.details
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33. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life.Sissela Bok - 1978 - In Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002. Princeton University Press. pp. 161-165.details
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Lying: moral choice in public and private life.Sissela Bok - 1978 - New York: Vintage Books.details
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Review of Sissela Bok: Lying: moral choice in public and private life. [REVIEW]Donald Meiklejohn - 1980 - Ethics 90 (2):296-300.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.details
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Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
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Lying as a scalar phenomenon.Neri Marsili - 2014 - In Sibilla Cantarini, Werner Abraham & Elizabeth Leiss (eds.), "Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between”,. John Benjamins Publishing.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Ben Levinstein - 2017details
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