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Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.details
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Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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A Problem in Probability (Letter to the Editor).Steve Selvin - 1975 - The American Statistician 29 (1):67.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.details
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Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.details
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Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793-812.details
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Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?Carl Wagner - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.details
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Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.R. C. Stalnaker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):399-409.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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Conditionalization, cogency, and cognitive value.Graham Oddie - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.details
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Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.details
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Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.details
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The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.details
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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The coherence argument against conditionalization.Matthias Hild - 1998 - Synthese 115 (2):229-258.details
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Auto-epistemology and updating.Matthias Hild - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):321-361.details
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Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism: A Solution for Conditionalizers.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):493-519.details
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