Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   279 citations  
  • Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  • Visual Versions.Robert Schwartz - 2006 - Bradford.
    These essays by Robert Schwartz on topics in the theory of vision are written from a pragmatic perspective. The issues and arguments will interest both philosophers and psychologists, covering new ground and bridging gaps between these disciplines. Schwartz begins historically, with discussions of problems raised and solutions offered in Bishop Berkeley's writings on vision, presenting Berkeley's views on spatial perception and the qualitative aspects of sensory experience in the context of recent theoretical and empirical work in vision theory. Schwartz then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Perception.Kevin Mulligan - 1995 - In Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge University Press. pp. 168-238.
    Husserl seems to have devoted roughly equal amounts of energy and pages to the description of perception, judgement, and imagination. By “description,” he meant the analysis of the traits and components of mental states or acts and their objects. As his views changed over the years about the nature of intentionality and philosophy, the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/01) gave way to descriptive programmes in which the objects of perception and of judgement were conceived of in terms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   649 citations  
  • Colour Constancy as Counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
    There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
    This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1936 citations  
  • Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Tyler Burge presents an original study of the most primitive ways in which individuals represent the physical world. By reflecting on the science of perception and related psychological and biological sciences, he gives an account of constitutive conditions for perceiving the physical world, and thus aims to locate origins of representational mind.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   345 citations  
  • On the Way Things Appear.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 461--480.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows.Roy Sorensen - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • What Are the Contents of Experiences.Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.
    I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   342 citations  
  • Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology.Stephen Palmer - 1999 - MIT Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   175 citations  
  • Seeing the Light.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85:193 - 218.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Color Constancy and the Complexity of Color.David Hilbert - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):141-158.
    We can start with a definition. “[C]olour constancy is the constancy of the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in the intensity and spectral composition of the illumination.” (Foster et al. 1997) Given the definition we can now ask a question: Does human color vision exhibit color constancy?1 The answer to the question depends in part on how we interpret it. If the question is understood as asking whether human color vision displays constancy for every possible scene across every possible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Being Coloured and Looking Coloured.Keith Allen - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 647-670.
    What is the relationship between being coloured and looking coloured? According to Alva Noë, to be coloured is to manifest a pattern of apparent colours as the perceptual conditions vary. I argue that Noë’s ‘phenomenal objectivism’ faces similar objections to attempts by traditional dispositionalist theories of colour to account for being coloured in terms of looking coloured. Instead, I suggest that to be coloured is to look coloured in a ‘non-perspectival’ sense, where non-perspectival looks transcend specific perceptual conditions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Perception and the Fall From Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
    In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   206 citations  
  • Senses for Senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
    If two subjects have phenomenally identical experiences, there is an important sense in which the way the world appears to them is precisely the same. But how are we to understand this notion of 'ways of appearing'? Most philosophers who have acknowledged the existence of phenomenal content have held that the way something appears is simply a matter of the properties something appears to have. On this view, the way something appears is simply the way something appears to be . (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Consciousness and the World.Brian O'Shaughnessy (ed.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Brian O'Shaughnessy puts forward a bold and original theory of consciousness, one of the most fascinating but puzzling aspects of human existence. He analyses consciousness into purely psychological constituents, according pre-eminence to its epistemological power; the result is an integrated picture of the conscious mind in its natural physical setting. Consciousness and the World is a rich and exciting book, a major contribution to our understanding of the mind.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Peacocke’s Trees.Boyd Millar - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):445-461.
    In Sense and Content , Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger ; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.
    In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three dimensions of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The World of Colour.David Katz, R. B. Macleod & C. W. Fox - 1936 - Philosophy 11 (43):370-371.
    First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • How to Think About Mental Qualities.David Rosenthal - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Brightness Constancy and the Nature of Achromatic Colors.Hans Wallach - 1948 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 38 (3):310.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • XI—Seeing the Light.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85 (1):193-218.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Why Experience Told Me Nothing About Transparency.Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):116-136.
    The transparency argument concludes that we're directly aware of external properties and not directly aware of the properties of experience. Focusing on the presentation used by Michael Tye (2002) I contend that the argument requires experience to have content that it cannot plausibly have. I attribute the failure to a faulty account of the transparency phenomenon and conclude by suggesting an alternative understanding that is independently plausible, is not an error-theory and yet renders the transparency of experience compatible with mental-paint (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Color Illusion.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):751-775.
    As standardly conceived, an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    "This admirable volume of readings is the first of a pair: the editors are to be applauded for placing the philosophy of color exactly where it should go, in ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Shadow‐Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of Colors.René Jagnow - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):187-212.
    It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way).Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 226.
    What colour does a white wall look in the pinkish light of the late afternoon? Philosophers disagree: they hold variously that it looks pink, white, both, and no colour at all. A new approach is offered. After reviewing the dispute, a reinterpretation of perceptual constancy is offered. In accordance with this reinterpretation, it is argued that perceptual features such as color must always be predicated of perceptual objects. Thus, it might be that in pinkish light, the wall looks white and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Reid's Rejection of Intentionalism.Todd Ganson - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:245-263.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations