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The myth of the essential indexical.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):723-734.details
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The Deferred Ostension Theory of Quotation.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):674 - 692.details
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The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.details
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Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.details
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Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.details
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Accommodating Presuppositions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):37-44.details
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Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.details
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The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.details
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Who, Me?Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466.details
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In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence Bonjour - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):657-663.details
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Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism.François Récanati - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.details
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
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Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
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Indexicality and de se reports.Philippe Schlenker - forthcoming - In Maienborn von Heusinger & Mouton Gruyter Portneder (eds.), Handbook of Semantics.details
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 179.details
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The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice - 1961 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.details
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What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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