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  1. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
    In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible (...)
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  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - Routledge.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • The Circle of Acquaintaince.David Woodruff Smith - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
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  • The Circle of Acquaintance. Perception, Consciousness and Empathy.David Woodruff Smith - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):994-997.
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  • Critique of Pure Reason.I. KANT - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
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  • Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
    One of the cornerstone books of Western philosophy, Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's seminal treatise, where he seeks to define the nature of reason itself and builds his own unique system of philosophical thought with an approach known as transcendental idealism. He argues that human knowledge is limited by the capacity for perception and attempts a logical designation of two varieties of knowledge: a posteriori, the knowledge acquired through experience; and a priori, knowledge not derived through experience. This accurate (...)
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  • Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.
    In Section I, I explain some key Sartrean terminology and in Section II, I introduce the HOT theory. Section III is where I argue for the close connection between Sartre’s theory and a somewhat modified version of the HOT theory. That section of the paper is divided into four subsections in which I also address the relevance of Sartre’s rejection of the Freudian unconscious and the threat of an infinite regress in his theory of consciousness. In Section IV, I critically (...)
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  • The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Truck Driver.William G. Lycan & Zena Ryder - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):132-136.
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  • Philosophical Studies.George Edward Moore - 1922 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Philosophical Studies THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is ...
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  • Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  • What is Consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press.
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  • Distracted Drivers and Unattended Experience.Wayne Wright - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):41-68.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists happily accept, but (...)
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  • The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining some kind of constitutive relation, rather than being (...)
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  • The Argument From Diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - In M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Alberta Press. pp. 341--90.
    1. Introduction In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, G.E.Moore observed that, "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922; p.25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular, have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against qualia, usually called the argument from diaphanousness or transparency.1 But even its friends concede that it is none too clear what the argument (...)
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  • Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character.Greg Janzen - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.
    This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves self-consciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a dearth (...)
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  • The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
    Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world.Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them. And these mental states very often have intentional content: they serve to represent the (...)
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  • The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. Second Version.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):361-384.
    Monitoring approaches to consciousness claim that a mental state is conscious when it is suitably monitored. Higher-order monitoring theory makes the monitoring state and the monitored state logically independent. Same-order monitoring theory claims a constitutive, non-contingent connection between the monitoring state and the monitored state. In this paper, I articulate different versions of the same-order monitoring theory and argue for its supremacy over the higher-order monitoring theory.
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  • Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
    In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness, I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of color and the location of (...)
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  • Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue (...)
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  • The Structure of Consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 1986 - Topoi 5 (September):149-156.
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  • Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  • A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):3-4.
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  • What's so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...)
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  • The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
    "This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument.
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  • Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
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  • Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology.David Woodruff Smith - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection explores the structure of consciousness and its place in the world, or inversely the structure of the world and the place of consciousness in it. Amongst the topics covered are: the phenomenological aspects of experience, dependencies between experience and the world and the basic ontological categories found in the world at large. Developing ideas drawn from historical figures such as Descartes, Husserl, Aristotle, and Whitehead, the essays together demonstrate the interdependence of ontology and phenomenology and its significance for (...)
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  • Inattentional Blindness.Arien Mack & Irvin Rock - 1998 - MIT Press.
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  • Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
    Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.
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  • The Nature of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):581-588.
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  • Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology.David Woodruff Smith - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):457-459.
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  • Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
    In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for (...)
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  • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690.John Locke - 1690 - Menston, Scolar Press.
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  • Consciousness, Self, and Attention.Jason Ford & David Woodruff Smith - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 353-377.
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  • Between Pure Self-Referentialism and the HOT Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
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  • Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All?Robert Van Gulick - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways (...)
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  • Representational Theories of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality (...)
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  • Back to Brentano?Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.
    For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...)
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  • Varieties of Higher-Order Theory.David Rosenthal - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  • Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
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  • Higher-Order Thoughts, Animal Consciousness, and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Carruthers and Levine.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2004 - In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
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  • The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.
    The so-called 'higher-order thought' theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it . The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged that the HOT theory (...)
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