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  1. Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts? [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):433-460.
    There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to (...)
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  • Kant and the Capacity to Judge.Kenneth R. Westphal & Beatrice Longuenesse - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):645.
    Kant famously declares that “although all our cognition commences with experience, … it does not on that account all arise from experience”. This marks Kant’s disagreement with empiricism, and his contention that human knowledge and experience require both sensation and the use of certain a priori concepts, the Categories. However, this is only the surface of Kant’s much deeper, though neglected view about the nature of reason and judgment. Kant holds that even our a priori concepts are acquired, not from (...)
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  • The Given Regained. Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience.Richard Schantz - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
    The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that (...)
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  • Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (10):266-277.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher PEACOCKE - 1992 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):409-412.
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  • Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
    How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...)
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  • Comment on Richard Schantz, "the Given Regained".John McDowell - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):181-184.
    Richard Schantz gives a concise and effective rehearsal of the background against which I find it liberating to see our experience as structured by our conceptual capacities, at least insofar as experience figures in the transcendental framework within which alone we can make sense of our having the world in view. Given how attractive that background makes the idea, I cannot see that Schantz makes the opposed conception he undertakes to defend even comparably compelling, let alone more compelling.
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  • Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons".Richard G. Heck Jr - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483 - 523.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans argues that the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual, in a sense I shall explain momentarily. More recently, in his book Mind and World, John McDowell has argued that the reasons Evans gives for this claim are not compelling and, moreover, that Evans’s view is a version of “the Myth of the Given”: More precisely, Evans’s view is alleged to suffer from the same sorts of problems that plague sense-datum theories of perception. In (...)
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  • Lawfulness Without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and Understanding.Hannah Ginsborg - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (1):37-81.
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  • A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 307-319.
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  • Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - In Rebecca Kukla (ed.), Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    In a well-known passage from the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Kant defines the power or faculty of judgment [Urteilskraft] as "the capacity to think the particular as contained under the universal" (Introduction IV, 5:179).1 He then distinguishes two ways in which this faculty can be exercised, namely as determining or as reflecting. These two ways are defined as follows: "If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it... is (...)
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  • Reasons for Belief.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
    Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is (...)
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  • The Given Regained: Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience.Richard Schantz - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
    The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that (...)
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  • Review: Reply to Commentators. [REVIEW]John McDowell - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):403 - 431.
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  • Perception, Concepts, and Memory.Michael G. F. Martin - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):745-63.
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  • The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
    The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...)
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  • Can There Be a New Empiricism?Michael Ayers - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:111-127.
    ‘Empiricism’ has become for many a dirty word, and many writers have in mind the kind of neo-Humean Positivism that is the target of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, or Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception. But examination of the Empiricist tradition before Hume uncovers views that do not involve anything like the much-abused “Myth of the Given” or twentieth-century sensedatum theory. This paper identifiesthe particular line of seventeenth-century thought that eventually gave rise to sense-datum theory, and (...)
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  • The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
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  • Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):381-388.
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  • Kant's Theory of Mental Activity.R. P. Wolff - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (1):133-134.
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  • Locke.Michael Ayers - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (271):123-125.
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  • Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
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  • Comment on Richard Schantz, "The Given Regained".John Mcdowell - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):181-184.
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  • Gesammelte Schriften. Kant - 1912 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 73:105-106.
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  • Between Instrumentalism and Brain-Writing.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - In Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.
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