Selections from the notebooks of the distinguished philosopher discuss subjects such as music, religion, thinking, science, architecture, and civilization.

Clarifies Wittgenstein's ideas about ethics and aesthetics and illustrates how those ideas apply to art history and criticism and to an understanding of the importance of art in people's lives.

Wittgenstein's elliptical remark on ‘the tremendous things in art’ in his 1938 ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’ has given rise to different interpretations as to the place this idea has in his aesthetics. This paper examines the views of Peter Lewis and Benjamin Tilghman on this issue. Both of them build their interpretations on the assumption that Wittgenstein contrasts the response to the tremendous with appreciation. Such an assumption, however, leads to results inconsistent with Wittgenstein's basic conception of aesthetics. For Wittgenstein, aesthetic (...) appreciation is not a formalistic activity, and one clear aspect of it is indeed well illustrated by the response to the tremendous. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine some important features of Peirce's and Wittgenstein's accounts of the nature of signs. The analysis shows that there are at least four points, regarding the nature of signs, on which Peirce and Wittgenstein agree. These are: the triadic nature of signs, the presence of degenerate signs in our discourses, the role of rules in the constitution of meaning, and the indispensable role of a community in creating and maintaining the network of signs. (...) Discovering these similarities does not mean that Peirce's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of semiotics are identical, as their authors make different assumptions about e.g. the aims of semiosis, but they nevertheless reach very similar conclusions. (shrink)

Mr. Danto argues that recent developments in the artworld, in particular the production of works of art that cannot be told from ordinary things, make urgent the need for a new theory of art and make plain the factors such a theory can and cannot involve. In the course of constructing such a theory, he seeks to demonstrate the relationship between philosophy and art, as well as the connections that hold between art and social institutions and art history. The book (...) distinguishes what belongs to artistic theory from what has traditionally been confused with it, namely aesthetic theory and offers as well a systematic account of metaphor, expression, and style, together with an original account 0f artistic representation. A wealth of examples, drawn especially from recent and contemporary art, illuminate the argument. (shrink)

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In an entry in his Notebooks 1914-1916 Wittgenstein appears to give some credit to the idea widespread in modern aesthetics that «the end of art is the beautiful »: «[…] there is certainly something» – he writes – in this conception. And he comments on: «[…] the beautiful is what makes happy » (NB 21.10.16). Maybe influenced by Tolstoy, who wrote that «people will come to understand the meaning of art only when they cease to consider that the aim of (...) that activity is beauty, i.e. pleasure», Wittgenstein does not adopt the idea without reservations. However, he admits that there is some validity to it. Therefore what we read in his Lectures on Aesthetics (1938) is rather intriguing: «It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgments are made, aesthetic adjectives such as ‘beautiful’, ‘fine’, etc., play hardly any role at all» (LE, I, 8). Why is this a remarkable fact? Is it because, in spite of beauty being the aim of art, when aesthetic judgments are made, the predicate ‘is beautiful’ plays a marginal role? And if this is the case, why is the supposed end of art almost neglected in art appreciation? Or is Wittgenstein simply bringing a word back from its metaphysical to its everyday use here (cf. PI, 116)? I will argue that, while in the Notebooks entry Wittgenstein tells us something important on what makes an aesthetic experience a valuable experience and/or an experience of value, in the Lectures the topic is a bit different. Wittgenstein is talking about the appreciation of objects and works of art, about the ways we aesthetically react to them. I will focus on this shift in point of view and on a distinction introduced in the Lectures between approval and appreciation. It is in the light of this distinction, that we can understand the observation about the unimportance of ‘beautiful’ in aesthetic judgment. In the final part of my talk I will argue that, contrary to this opinion, the adjective ‘beautiful’ is of significance in aesthetic judgment. (shrink)