- Telling as inviting to trust.Edward S. Hinchman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Friendship and Belief.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):329-351.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Is it Rational to Trust?Jeremy Wanderer & Leo Townsend - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):1-14.details
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Aristotle and Kant on self-disclosure in friendship.Andrea Veltman - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):225-239.details
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Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.details
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What Is Trust?Thomas W. Simpson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):550-569.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Slaves of the passions * by mark Schroeder.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.details
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Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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Honesty and Intimacy in Kant’s Duty of Friendship.R. Patricia C. Flynn - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):417-424.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Love as valuing a relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.details
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Friendship and epistemic norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.details
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Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.details
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Trust as an Affective Attitude.Karen Jones, Russell Hardin & Lawrence C. Becker - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.details
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Is it Rational to Trust? [REVIEW]Leo Townsend Jeremy Wanderer - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):1-14.details
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Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.details
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Trust, Distrust and Commitment.Katherine Hawley - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):1-20.details
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Trust, Distrust and Commitment.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):1-20.details
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Partiality and prejudice in trusting.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Commitments, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Trust and Rationality.Judith Baker - 1987 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1):1-13.details
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Trust and antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.details
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Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Love as Valuing a Relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Friendship.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship.David B. Annis - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (4):349 - 356.details
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Trust and Terror.Karen Jones - 2004 - In Peggy DesAutels & Margaret Urban Walker (eds.), Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 3--18.details
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Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: the Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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What is it to Believe Someone?Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1979 - In C. F. Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief. University of Notre Dame Press.details
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