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  1. An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.
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  • Deep Inconsistency.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):321-331.
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  • What Good Are Our Intuitions: Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds.Sally Haslanger - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):89-118.
    Across the humanities and social sciences it has become commonplace for scholars to argue that categories once assumed to be “natural” are in fact “social” or, in the familiar lingo, “socially constructed”. Two common examples of such categories are race and gender, but there many others. One interpretation of this claim is that although it is typically thought that what unifies the instances of such categories is some set of natural or physical properties, instead their unity rests on social features (...)
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  • Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
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  • Inconsistency Theories: The Significance of Semantic Ascent.Douglas Patterson - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):575-589.
    This is a discussion of different ways of working out the idea that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are somehow “inconsistent”. I take the workable form of the idea to be that there are expressions such that a necessary condition of understanding them is that one be inclined to accept inconsistent claims (an conception also suggested by Matti Eklund). I then distinguish “simple” from “complex” forms of such views. On a simple theory, such expressions are meaningless, while on (...)
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  • Inconsistent Languages.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
    The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox.
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  • Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness.Delia Graff - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28:45-82.
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  • Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
    It is argued that a certain form of the view that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are "inconsistent" provides the best response to the semantic paradoxes. After extended discussions of the views of Kirk Ludwig and Matti Eklund, it is argued that in its strongest formulation the view maintains that understanding a natural language is sharing cognition of an inconsistent semantic theory for that language with other speakers. A number of aspects of this approach are discussed and a (...)
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  • Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.
    Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of ‘knowledge’‐ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI.
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  • Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.Alfred Tarski - 1936 - In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 152--278.
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  • Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can (...)
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  • Definitions, Consistent and Inconsistent.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):147 - 175.
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  • The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
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  • Word and Object.Willard van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    In the course of the discussion, Professor Quine pinpoints the difficulties involved in translation, brings to light the anomalies and conflicts implicit in our ...
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  • Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
    APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...)
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  • Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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  • Meaning‐Constitutivity.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):559-574.
    I discuss some problems faced by the meaning‐inconsistency view on the liar and sorites paradoxes which I have elsewhere defended. Most of the discussion is devoted to the question of what a defender of the meaning‐inconsistency view should say about semantic competence.
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  • The Concept of Truth and the Semantics of the Truth Predicate.Kirk Ludwig & Emil Badici - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):622-638.
    We sketch an account according to which the semantic concepts themselves are not pathological and the pathologies that attend the semantic predicates arise because of the intention to impose on them a role they cannot fulfill, that of expressing semantic concepts for a language that includes them. We provide a simplified model of the account and argue in its light that (i) a consequence is that our meaning intentions are unsuccessful, and such semantic predicates fail to express any concept, and (...)
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  • Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
    Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of language.
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  • Philosophical Writings.P. F. Strawson - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents twenty-two uncollected philosophical essays by Sir Peter Strawson, one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. The essays (two of them previously unpublished) are drawn from seven decades of work, from 1949 to 2003. They span the broad range of Strawson's work: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, ethical theory, and history of philosophy, along with metaphilosophical reflections and intellectual autobiography.
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  • The Semantic Conception of Truth.Alfred Tarski - 1944 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.
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  • A Paradox Regained.D. Kaplan & R. Montague - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.
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  • Wang's Paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.
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  • What Vagueness Consists In.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
    The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is (...)
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  • Words.David Kaplan - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):93-119.
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  • Vagueness Without Paradox.Diana Raffman - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):41-74.
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  • Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
    Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. (...)
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  • Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
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  • Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency.H. Field - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):567-606.
    It might be thought that we could argue for the consistency of a mathematical theory T within T, by giving an inductive argument that all theorems of T are true and inferring consistency. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem any such argument must break down, but just how it breaks down depends on the kind of theory of truth that is built into T. The paper surveys the possibilities, and suggests that some theories of truth give far more intuitive diagnoses of (...)
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  • Hop, Skip and Jump: The Agonistic Conception of Truth.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:371-396.
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  • Logical Foundations of Probability.Ernest H. Hutten - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):205-207.
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  • Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (30):87-88.
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  • Tarski, the Liar, and Inconsistent Languages.Douglas Eden Patterson - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):150-177.
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  • XIII—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.Stephen Schiffer - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):317-334.
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  • Truth, the Liar, and Relativism.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):427-510.
    This essay proposes a theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. The paradoxes associated with truth (for example, the liar) and the pattern of failures in our attempts to deal with them suggest that truth is an inconsistent concept. The first part of the essay describes a pair of replacement concepts, which the essay dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory (...)
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  • Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
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  • Understanding the Liar.Douglas Patterson - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
    (Beall ed. The Revenge of the Liar, forthcoming from Oxford University Press) > The main presentation of my approach to the semantic paradoxes. I take them to show that understanding a natural language is sharing a cognitive relation to a logically false semantic theory with other speakers.
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