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Akrasia and the Constitution of Agency.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Practical Knowledge Revisited.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):128-137.details
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Practical knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.details
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Knowing How.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):285-307.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Assertion and safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796.details
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Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.details
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Intention, belief, and wishful thinking: Setiya on “practical knowledge”.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):546-557.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Intention as Faith: Rae Langton.Rae Langton - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:243-258.details
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Learning from Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77-101.details
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In support of anti-intellectualism.Victor Kumar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.details
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Intending, knowing how, infinitives.Jennifer Hornsby - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-17.details
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Jennifer Hornsby.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-130.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.details
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