- Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.details
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How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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Reliability Theories of Justified Credence.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):63-94.details
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Resiliency, propensities, and causal necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.details
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On second order probabilities and the notion of epistemic risk.Nils-Eric Sahlin - unknowndetails
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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The weights of evidence.Dale A. Nance - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):pp. 267-281.details
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Self-deception: Adaptation or by-product?Hugo Mercier - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):35-35.details
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Formal models of source reliability.Christoph Merdes, Momme von Sydow & Ulrike Hahn - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S23):5773-5801.details
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The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.details
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Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):767-794.details
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Do we need second-order probabilities?Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):525-533.details
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Do We Need Second‐Order Probabilities?Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):525-533.details
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A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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When no Reason for is a Reason against.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):426-431.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.Andy Egan & Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.details
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Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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Second-order probabilities and belief functions.Jonathan Baron - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (1):25-36.details
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A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 115.details
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A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 18-30.details
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Bayes Nets and Rationality.Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - In The Handbook of Rationality. Boston, Massachusetts, USA:details
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Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (11):1-39.details
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Moral discourse boosts confidence in moral judgments.Nora Heinzelmann, Benedikt Höltgen & Viet Tran - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):587-602.details
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