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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.David Shoemaker - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):602-632.details
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Defending Evidence-Resistant Beliefs.Nikolai Viedge - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):517-537.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.Thomas Pink - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.details
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Religious Credence is not Factual Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):698-715.details
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Beyond Fakers and Fanatics: a Reply to Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):1-6.details
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In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions.Elisabeth Pacherie Tim Bayne - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-188.details
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Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking.Valerie A. Thompson & Stephen C. Johnson - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):215-244.details
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Beliefs and subdoxastic states.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account.Angela M. Smith - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):575-589.details
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Caring, identification, and agency.David W. Shoemaker - 2003 - Ethics 114 (1):88-118.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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Skepticism about moral responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.details
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Belief as Delusional and Delusion as Belief.Jennifer Radden - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):43-46.details
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Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder.Hanna Pickard - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):209-224.details
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Responsibility without Blame for Addiction.Hanna Pickard - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):169-180.details
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Two paradigms for religious representation: The physicist and the playground.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2017 - Cognition 164 (C):206-211.details
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Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.details
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Delusions: A Different Kind of Belief?Richard Mullen & Grant Gillett - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):27-37.details
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Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.details
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The Normativity of Automaticity.Alex Madva Michael Brownstein - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.details
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Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs.Alex Madva - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).details
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Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind.Alex Madva & Michael Brownstein - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):611-644.details
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Does 'Ought' Still Imply 'Can'?Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):821-828.details
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Religious beliefs are factual beliefs: Content does not correlate with context sensitivity.Neil Levy - 2017 - Cognition 161 (C):109-116.details
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Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.details
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Why Be Rational&quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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