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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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From A Rational Point Of View.Tim Henning - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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Level-Confusions in Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Dynamics of Epistemic Modality.Malte Willer - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.details
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Wondering what might be.Moritz Schulz - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):367 - 386.details
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Epistemic modals and informational consequence.Moritz Schulz - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):385 - 395.details
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Expressivism concerning epistemic modals.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.details
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Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.details
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Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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Modals under epistemic tension.Guillermo Del Pinal & Brandon Waldon - 2019 - Natural Language Semantics 27 (2):135-188.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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Must we act only on what we know?Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (8):463-473.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.details
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Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):425-448.details
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The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith DeRose - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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Epistemic luck, safety, and assertion.Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Observations on embedding verbs, evidentiality, and presupposition.Mandy Simons - 2007details
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Norms of assertion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250.details
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Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.details
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A problem about permission and possibility.Stephen Yablo - 2009 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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