- Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton University Press.details
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Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Lying despite telling the truth.Alex Wiegmann, Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):37-42.details
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Norms of assertion.Matthew Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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The truth about lying.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2015 - Cognition 138 (C):161-168.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Lying, fast and slow.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):757-775.details
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Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases.John Turri - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):104-115.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.details
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Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.details
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Reply to Roy Sorensen, 'Knowledge-lies'.Julia Staffel - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):300-302.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.details
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Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.details
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No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying.Ronja Rutschmann & Alex Wiegmann - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):438-457.details
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.details
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Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.details
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Deontology and the ethics of lying.Arnold Isenberg - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):463-480.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Implicit Belief and A Priori Knowledge.John Hawthorne - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):191-210.details
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Implicit Belief and A Priori Knowledge.John Hawthorne - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):191-210.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Lying, risk and accuracy.Sam Fox Krauss - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):726-734.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.details
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Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.details
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Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth.Don Fallis & Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:277-309.details
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Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?Don Fallis - 2014 - Ratio 28 (1):81-96.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Communicating, Telling, and Informing.Wayne A. Davis - 1999 - Philosophical Inquiry 21 (1):21-43.details
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The intent to deceive.Roderick M. Chisholm & Thomas D. Feehan - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):143-159.details
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