The question of David Armstrong's recent book, What Is a Law of Nature? would seem to have little point unless there really are laws of nature. However that may be, so much philosoFhical thinking has utilized this concept, that an inquiry of this sort was needed whether there are or not. The book begins with a devastating attack on so-called Regularity views of law, and then proceeds with an exposition of Armstrong's own answer to the question. I wish to raise (...) here some difficulties for Armstrong's answer, concentrating on his account of probabilistic laws where I see the severest problems. To locate myself with respect to his approach, however, I shall first enter some lesser demurrals. (shrink)

It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...) expressed by singular statements of fact describing the relationship between universal properties and magnitudes. (shrink)

This paper considers definitions of classical dynamical chaos that focus primarily on notions of predictability and computability, sometimes called algorithmic complexity definitions of chaos. I argue that accounts of this type are seriously flawed. They focus on a likely consequence of chaos, namely, randomness in behavior which gets characterized in terms of the unpredictability or uncomputability of final given initial states. In doing so, however, they can overlook the definitive feature of dynamical chaos--the fact that the underlying motion generating the (...) behavior exhibits extreme trajectory instability. I formulate a simple criterion of adequacy for any definition of chaos and show how such accounts fail to satisfy it. (shrink)

Michael P. Levine; V*—Mackie's Account of Necessity in Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 75–90, https:/.

Determinism is a perennial topic of philosophical discussion. Very little acquaintance with the philosophical literature is needed to reveal the Tower of ...

1 Introduction When we ask why something happens or has happened, from earthquakes to car accidents or urban riots, we ask for its cause or causes. ' Cause' comes into practical life, into the experimental sciences, and, perhaps more ...

A new edition of this well-established monograph, this volume provides a comprehensive overview over the still fascinating field of chaos research. The authors include recent developments such as systems with restricted degrees of freedom but put also a strong emphasis on the mathematical foundations. Partly illustrated in color, this fourth edition features new sections from applied nonlinear science, like control of chaos, synchronisation of nonlinear systems, and turbulence, as well as recent theoretical concepts like strange nonchaotic attractors, on-off intermittency and (...) spatio-temporal chaotic motion. (shrink)

Your story is there waiting for you, it has been waiting for you there a hundred years, long before you were born and you cannot change a comma of it. Everything you do you have to do. You are the twig, and the water you float on swept you here. You are the leaf, and the breeze you were borne on blew you here. This is your story and you cannot escape it.—Cornell Woolrich, I Married a Dead Man.

Some irrational numbers are "random" in a sense which implies that no algorithm can compute their decimal expansions to an arbitrarily high degree of accuracy. This feature of (most) irrational numbers has been claimed to be at the heart of the deterministic, but chaotic, behavior exhibited by many nonlinear dynamical systems. In this paper, a number of now classical chaotic systems are shown to remain chaotic when their domains are restricted to the computable real numbers, providing counterexamples to the above (...) claim. More fundamentally, the randomness view of chaos is shown to be based upon a confusion between a chaotic function on a phase space and its numerical representation in Rn. (shrink)

The theoretical framework adopted in the exact sciences, for constructing and testing deterministic theories on the one hand, and modelling and analysis of observed phenomena on the other, is often implicitly assumed to be that of structural stability. In view of recent developments in nonlinear dynamics, it is argued here that in general it may not be possible to assume strict determinism and structural stability simultaneously; either strict determinism holds, in which case the fragility framework may turn out to be (...) the appropriate framework for the study of certain phenomena in the exact sciences, or ‘structural stability’ is restored at the expense of introducing stochasticity. In this sense a certain degree of indeterminacy may be unavoidable even at the classical level. (shrink)