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Sartre

In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge. pp. 82-93 (2016)

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  1. The Language of Imagination.Alan R. White - 1990 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  • The Language of Imagination.Alastair Hannay - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):245-247.
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  • Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
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  • Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
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  • Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning.Colin McGinn - 2004 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    The guiding thread of this book is the distinction Colin McGinn draws between perception and imagination.
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  • Colin McGinn, Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning. [REVIEW]Dominic Mclver Lopes - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):543-545.
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  • What Perky did not show.Robert Hopkins - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):431-439.
    Some philosophers take Perky's experiments to show that perceiving can be mistaken for visualizing and so that the two sometimes match in phenomenology. On Segal’s alternative interpretation Perky’s subjects did not consciously perceive the stimuli at all. I argue that even setting this alternative aside, Perky's results do not prove what the philosophers think. She showed her subjects, not the objects they were asked to visualise, but pictures of them. What they mistook for visualizing was not perceptual consciousness of stimuli, (...)
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  • Imagination and affective response.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge. pp. 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
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  • Sensations and Brain Processes.J. J. C. Smart - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • Imagination and perception.P. F. Strawson - 1982 - In Ralph Charles Sutherland Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford University Press.
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  • An Experimental Study of Imagination.Charles West Perky - 1911 - Philosophical Review 20:108.
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