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  1. Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 33-40.
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  • The Regress of Metajustification.Matthias Steup - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):41 - 56.
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  • Reply to Steup.Laurence Bonjour - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):57 - 63.
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  • The Myth of the Given.Roderick Chisholm - 1964 - In Roderick M. Chisholm (ed.), Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. pp. 261--286.
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  • Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
    According to a simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification, a belief is justified if and only if the process leading to that belief is reliable. The idea behind this theory is simple and attractive. There are a variety of mental or cognitive processes that result in beliefs. Some of these processes are reliable—they generally yield true beliefs—and the beliefs they produce are justified. Other processes are unreliable and the beliefs they produce are unjustified. So, for example, reliable (...)
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  • Contra Reliabilism.Carl Ginet - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):175-187.
    The reliability of a belief-producing process is a matter of how likely it is that the process will produce beliefs that are true. The term reliabilism may be used to refer to any position that makes this idea of reliability central to the explication of some important epistemic concept. I know of three such positions that appeal to some epistemologists: a reliabilist account of what makes a belief justified, a reliabilist account of what makes a true belief knowledge, and a (...)
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  • Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism.Steven Rappaport - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (3):433-.
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  • Believing and Affirming.Robert Audi - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):115-120.
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  • Basic Propositions.Charles A. Baylis & A. J. Ayer - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):299.
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  • Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress.Richard Foley - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):311 - 316.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine (...)
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  • The Theory of Appearing.W. P. Alston - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
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