- Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.details
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Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind–body problem and mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.details
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Emergentism and supervenience physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):83 – 98.details
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Review: Concepts and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Stephen Yablo - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455 - 463.details
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Supervenience-based formulations of physicalism.Jessica Wilson - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):426-459.details
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On characterizing the physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-602.details
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Ways a world might be.Robert Stalnaker - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):439 - 441.details
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Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’.David Spurrett & David Papineau - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):25-29.details
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Identity, Cause, and Mind by Sydney Shoemaker. [REVIEW]Colin McGinn - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):227-232.details
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Mental events and the brain.Jerome Shaffer - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):160-6.details
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Could mental states be brain processes?Jerome Shaffer - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.details
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The Logic of What Might Have Been.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2001 - MIT Press.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):207-210.details
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Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness1.Christopher S. Hill - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):147-147.details
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The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The knowledge argument against dualism.Yujin Nagasawa - 2002 - Theoria 68 (3):205-223.details
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Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The body problem.Barbara Montero - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):183-200.details
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A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262-264.details
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A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modem Materialism. [REVIEW]Andrew Botterell - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.details
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On the need for properties: The road to pythagoreanism and back.C. B. Martin - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):193-231.details
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Mental representation and the subjectivity of consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.details
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Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.details
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.details
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Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind and the Physical World.Barry Loewer - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):655-662.details
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The Two‐Dimensionalist Reductio.Robert J. Howell - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):348-358.details
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The knowledge argument and objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.details
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Self-knowledge and self-reference.Robert J. Howell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.details
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There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.details
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Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.details
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From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Blocking Definitions of Materialism.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):103-113.details
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Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.details
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Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens.Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.details
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Mental causation, determinables, and property instances.Douglas Ehring - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):461-80.details
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The physical: Empirical, not metaphysical.J. L. Dowell, & Janice Dowell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.details
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Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’.Seth Crook - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-359.details
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Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’.Seth Crook - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-359.details
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There is No Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):185-206.details
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Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.details
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Imagination, indexicality, and intensions. [REVIEW]David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.details
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Consciousness and its Place in Nature.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell. pp. 102–142.details
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Abstract particulars.Keith Campbell - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Abstract Particulars.E. J. Lowe - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):104-106.details
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