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Chance and Necessity : From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection.Wolfgang Spohn - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells. Springer. pp. 101-132.details
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Actual causation and the art of modeling.Joseph Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2010 - In Halpern Joseph & Hitchcock Christopher (eds.), Causality, Probability, and Heuristics: A Tribute to Judea Pearl. College Publications. pp. 383-406.details
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Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge.Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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A peculiarity in pearl’s logic of interventionist counterfactuals.Jiji Zhang, Wai-Yin Lam & Rafael De Clercq - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):783-794.details
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A Lewisian Logic of Causal Counterfactuals.Jiji Zhang - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (1):77-93.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Review of M aking Things Happen. [REVIEW]Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):545-547.details
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Relative Frequencies.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1977 - Synthese 34 (2):133-166.details
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II_— _Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):153-168.details
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II_— _Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):153-168.details
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Epistemic consequentialism.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):153–168.details
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The Measurement of Ranks and the Laws of Iterated Contraction.Wolfgang Spohn & Matthias Hild - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (10):1195-1218.details
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A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.details
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Experience and Prediction.William R. Dennes - 1939 - Philosophical Review 48 (5):536-538.details
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Experience and Prediction.Eleanor Bisbee - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (3):360-366.details
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Two Autonomous Axiom Systems for the Calculus of Probabilities.Karl R. Popper - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (3):349-349.details
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Two autonomous axiom systems for the calculus of probabilities.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (21):51-57.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism.Philip Percival - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):121-151.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism.Philip Percival - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):121–151.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism: Philip Percival.Philip Percival - 2002 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):121-151.details
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Aspect Causation.L. A. Paul - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235.details
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Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. [REVIEW]E. N. & Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (10):270.details
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Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1994 - Cogito 8 (2):141-146.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part A.Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):26-84.details
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Structural equations and beyond.Franz Huber - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.details
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The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.details
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New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
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Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.details
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Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.details
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Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Christopher Hitchcock & Judea Pearl - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):639.details
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From causal models to counterfactual structures.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):305-322.details
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Compact Representations of Extended Causal Models.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):986-1010.details
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Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81-88.details
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An axiomatic characterization of causal counterfactuals.David Galles & Judea Pearl - 1998 - Foundations of Science 3 (1):151-182.details
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Relative frequencies.Bas C. Fraassen - 1977 - Synthese 34 (2):133 - 166.details
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The Presidential Address: Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):1 - 21.details
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Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.details
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I-Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.details
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On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.details
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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | Vol 73, No 3.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (24):351-351.details
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Dispositions. [REVIEW]John W. Carroll - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):82-84.details
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Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality.Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder & Franz Huber - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):279-300.details
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The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):81--92.details
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Interventionist counterfactuals.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.details
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