Switch to: Citations

References in:

Conceptual Therapy: An Introduction to Framework-relative Epistemology

St. Louis, MO, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior (1983, 2014)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Operational Aspect of Meaning.P. W. Bridgman - 1949 - Synthese 8 (1):251 - 259.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks.Steven James Bartlett - 2002 - Animal Law 8:143-176.
    A combined psychological-epistemological study of the blocks that stand in the way of the human recognition of the sentience and legal rights of non-human animals. Originally published in the Lewis and Clark law journal, Animal Law, and subsequently translated into German and into Portuguese.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Self-Refutation and Validity.Henry W. Johnstone Jr - 1964 - The Monist 48 (4):467 - 485.
    It has often been argued that since all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, and philosophical arguments are neither, no philosophical arguments are sound. In his recent book Philosophical Reasoning, Passmore attempts to show that sound philosophical arguments are possible. He does this not by attacking the premise that all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, but rather by attacking the premise that philosophical arguments are neither deductive nor inductive. In fact, he asserts, “Philosophical reasoning, if it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • D. A. Bočvar. Ob Odnom Tréhznačnom Isčislénii I Égo Priménénii K Analizu Paradoksov Klassičéskogo Rasširénnogo Funkcional'nogo Isčisléniá . Matématičéskij Sbornik , N. S. Vol. 4 , Pp. 287–308.Alonzo Church - 1939 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):98-99.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Self-Refutation and Validity.Henry W. Johnstone Jr - 1964 - The Monist 48 (4):467-485.
    It has often been argued that since all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, and philosophical arguments are neither, no philosophical arguments are sound. In his recent book Philosophical Reasoning, Passmore attempts to show that sound philosophical arguments are possible. He does this not by attacking the premise that all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, but rather by attacking the premise that philosophical arguments are neither deductive nor inductive. In fact, he asserts, “Philosophical reasoning, if it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations