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  1. Values and Uncertainties in Climate Prediction, Revisited.Wendy Parker - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:24-30.
    Philosophers continue to debate both the actual and the ideal roles of values in science. Recently, Eric Winsberg has offered a novel, model-based challenge to those who argue that the internal workings of science can and should be kept free from the influence of social values. He contends that model-based assignments of probability to hypotheses about future climate change are unavoidably influenced by social values. I raise two objections to Winsberg’s argument, neither of which can wholly undermine its conclusion but (...)
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  • From Social Values to P-Values: The Social Epistemology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Stephen John - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):157-171.
    In this article I ask two questions prompted by the phenomenon of ‘politically patterned’ climate change denial. First, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to cognitive experts’ testimony? Building on work in philosophy of science on inductive risk, I argue they can. Second, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's testimony? I argue that they cannot, because of the high epistemic (...)
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  • Inductive Risk and the Contexts of Communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative contexts. Sect. 4 analyses (...)
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  • When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
    Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among (...)
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  • In Defence of the Value Free Ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
    The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current (...)
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  • The Nature and Structure of Content. By Jeffrey C. King. (Oxford UP, 2007. Pp. X + 230. Price £37.50 Hardback. £17.99 Paperback).Nicholas Unwin - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):876-878.
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  • Masking Disagreement Among Experts.John Beatty - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):52-67.
    There are many reasons why scientific experts may mask disagreement and endorse a position publicly as “jointly accepted.” In this paper I consider the inner workings of a group of scientists charged with deciding not only a technically difficult issue, but also a matter of social and political importance: the maximum acceptable dose of radiation. I focus on how, in this real world situation, concerns with credibility, authority, and expertise shaped the process by which this group negotiated the competing virtues (...)
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  • Truth and Truthfulness An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Arthur Owen Williams - 2002 - Philosophy 78 (305):411-414.
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  • Infotopia: Unleashing the Democratic Power of Transparency.Archon Fung - 2013 - Politics and Society 41 (2):183-212.
    In Infotopia, citizens enjoy a wide range of information about the organizations upon which they rely for the satisfaction of their vital interests. The provision of that information is governed by principles of democratic transparency. Democratic transparency both extends and critiques current enthusiasms about transparency. It urges us to conceptualize information politically, as a resource to turn the behavior of large organizations in socially beneficial ways. Transparency efforts have targets, and we should think of those targets as large organizations: public (...)
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  • The Ethics of Scientific Communication Under Uncertainty.Robert O. Keohane, Melissa Lane & Michael Oppenheimer - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (4):343-368.
    Communication by scientists with policy makers and attentive publics raises ethical issues. Scientists need to decide how to communicate knowledge effectively in a way that nonscientists can understand and use, while remaining honest scientists and presenting estimates of the uncertainty of their inferences. They need to understand their own ethical choices in using scientific information to communicate to audiences. These issues were salient in the Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change with respect to possible sea level rise (...)
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  • “Author TBD”: Radical Collaboration in Contemporary Biomedical Research.Rebecca Kukla - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):845-858.
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  • Should We Aim for Consensus?Alfred Moore & John Beatty - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):198-214.
    There can be good reasons to doubt the authority of a group of scientists. But those reasons do not include lack of unanimity among them. Indeed, holding science to a unanimity or near-unanimity standard has a pernicious effect on scientific deliberation, and on the transparency that is so crucial to the authority of science in a democracy. What authorizes a conclusion is the quality of the deliberation that produced it, which is enhanced by the presence of a non-dismissible minority. Scientists (...)
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  • Masking Disagreement Among Experts.John Beatty - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):52-67.
    There are many reasons why scientific experts may mask disagreement and endorse a position publicly as “jointly accepted.” In this paper I consider the inner workings of a group of scientists charged with deciding not only a technically difficult issue, but also a matter of social and political importance: the maximum acceptable dose of radiation. I focus on how, in this real world situation, concerns with credibility, authority, and expertise shaped the process by which this group negotiated the competing virtues (...)
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  • The Ethics of Belief, Cognition, and Climate Change Pseudoskepticism: Implications for Public Discourse.Lawrence Torcello - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):19-48.
    The relationship between knowledge, belief, and ethics is an inaugural theme in philosophy; more recently, under the title “ethics of belief” philosophers have worked to develop the appropriate methodology for studying the nexus of epistemology, ethics, and psychology. The title “ethics of belief” comes from a 19th-century paper written by British philosopher and mathematician W.K. Clifford. Clifford argues that we are morally responsible for our beliefs because each belief that we form creates the cognitive circumstances for related beliefs to follow, (...)
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  • Rational Irrationality: Modeling Climate Change Belief Polarization Using Bayesian Networks.John Cook & Stephan Lewandowsky - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):160-179.
    Belief polarization is said to occur when two people respond to the same evidence by updating their beliefs in opposite directions. This response is considered to be “irrational” because it involves contrary updating, a form of belief updating that appears to violate normatively optimal responding, as for example dictated by Bayes' theorem. In light of much evidence that people are capable of normatively optimal behavior, belief polarization presents a puzzling exception. We show that Bayesian networks, or Bayes nets, can simulate (...)
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  • Philosophy of Climate Science Part II: Modelling Climate Change.Roman Frigg, Erica Thompson & Charlotte Werndl - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):965-977.
    This is the second of three parts of an introduction to the philosophy of climate science. In this second part about modelling climate change, the topics of climate modelling, confirmation of climate models, the limits of climate projections, uncertainty and finally model ensembles will be discussed.
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  • Testimonial Entitlement, Norms of Assertion and Privacy.Philip J. Nickel - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):207-217.
    According to assurance views of testimonial justification, in virtue of the act of testifying a speaker provides an assurance of the truth of what she asserts to the addressee. This assurance provides a special justificatory force and a distinctive normative status to the addressee. It is thought to explain certain asymmetries between addressees and other unintended hearers (bystanders and eavesdroppers), such as the phenomenon that the addressee has a right to blame the speaker for conveying a falsehood but unintended hearers (...)
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  • Climate Skepticism and the Manufacture of Doubt: Can Dissent in Science Be Epistemically Detrimental?Justin B. Biddle & Anna Leuschner - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):261-278.
    The aim of this paper is to address the neglected but important problem of differentiating between epistemically beneficial and epistemically detrimental dissent. By “dissent,” we refer to the act of objecting to a particular conclusion, especially one that is widely held. While dissent in science can clearly be beneficial, there might be some instances of dissent that not only fail to contribute to scientific progress, but actually impede it. Potential examples of this include the tobacco industry’s funding of studies that (...)
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  • Speech Acts, Attitudes, and Scientific Practice: Can Searle Handle "Assuming for the Sake of Hypothesis?".Daniel J. McKaughan - 2012 - Pragmatics and Cognition 20 (1):88-106.
    There are certain illocutionary acts that, contrary to John Searle's speech act theory, cannot be correctly classified as assertives. Searle's sincerity and essential conditions on assertives require, plausibly, that we believe our assertions and that we are committed to their truth. Yet it is a commonly accepted scientific practice to propose and investigate an hypothesis without believing it or being at all committed to its truth. Searle's attempt to accommodate such conjectural acts by claiming that the degree of belief and (...)
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  • Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony.Elizabeth Anderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):144-164.
    Responsible public policy making in a technological society must rely on complex scientific reasoning. Given that ordinary citizens cannot directly assess such reasoning, does this call the democratic legitimacy of technical public policies in question? It does not, provided citizens can make reliable second-order assessments of the consensus of trustworthy scientific experts. I develop criteria for lay assessment of scientific testimony and demonstrate, in the case of claims about anthropogenic global warming, that applying such criteria is easy for anyone of (...)
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  • Science in a Democratic Society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101:95-112.
    Claims that science should be more democratic than it is frequently arouse opposition. In this essay, I distinguish my own views about the democratization of science from the more ambitious theses defended by Paul Feyerabend. I argue that it is unlikely that the complexity of some scientific debates will allow for resolution according to the methodological principles of any formal confirmation theory, suggesting instead that major revolutions rest on conflicts of values. Yet these conflicts should not be dismissed as irresoluble.
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  • Learning From Words. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.
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  • When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
    Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among (...)
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  • Conveying Information.Peter J. Graham - 2000 - Synthese 123 (3):365-392.
    This paper states three counterexamples to the claim that testimony cannot generate knowledge, that a hearer can only acquire testimonial knowledge from a speaker who knows: a twins case, the fossil case, and an inversion case. The paper provides an explanation for why testimony can generate knowledge. Testimonial knowledge involves the flow of information from a speaker to a hearer through the linguistic channel.
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  • Speech Acts, Attitudes, and Scientific Practice: Can Searle Handle `Assuming for the Sake of Hypothesis'?Daniel J. McKaughan - 2012 - Pragmatics and Cognition 20 (1):88-106.
    There are certain illocutionary acts that, contrary to John Searle's speech act theory, cannot be correctly classified as assertives. Searle's sincerity and essential conditions on assertives require, plausibly, that we believe our assertions and that we are committed to their truth. Yet it is a commonly accepted scientific practice to propose and investigate an hypothesis without believing it or being at all committed to its truth. Searle's attempt to accommodate such conjectural acts by claiming that the degree of belief and (...)
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  • The Epistemology of Testimony.Peter Lipton - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):1-31.
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  • Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-First Century? By David Fisher. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. Viii + 303. Price £25.00).C. L. Ten - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):881-883.
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  • Love's Vision. By Troy Jollimore. (Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. 220. Price $35.00.).Irene McMullin - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):871-874.
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  • Philosophers Past and Present: Selected Essays. By Barry Stroud. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. Pp. Viii + 338. Price £37.50.).Michael Rush - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):869-871.
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  • Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction. By Barry Stroud. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 184. Price £32.50.).Matthew Parrott - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):883-886.
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  • On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. By G. A. Cohen. Michael Otsuka (Ed.) (Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. Xiii + 268. Price £59.00.).Joyce L. Jenkins - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):867-869.
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  • The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized. By Owen Flanagan. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011. Pp. Xvi + 264, £19.95.).Graham George Priest - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):862-864.
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  • From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe. Edited By M. Geach and L. Gormally. (St Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs) (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011. Pp. Xx + 246. Paperback £17.95, $34.90.).Roger Teichmann - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):874-876.
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  • Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?Elizabeth Fricker - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
    Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or (...)
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  • Climate Change, Epistemic Trust, and Expert Trustworthiness. Almassi - 2012 - Ethics and the Environment 17 (2):29-49.
    The evidence most of us have for our beliefs on global climate change, the extent of human contribution to it, and appropriate anticipatory and mitigating actions turns crucially on epistemic trust. We extend trust or distrust to many varied others: scientists performing original research, intergovernmental agencies and those reviewing research, think tanks offering critique and advocating skepticism, journalists transmitting and interpreting claims, even social systems of modern science such as peer-reviewed publication and grant allocation. Our personal experiences and assessments of (...)
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  • Climate Science Controversies and the Demand for Access to Empirical Data.James W. McAllister - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):871-880.
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  • Aesthetics and Film. By Katherine Thomson‐Jones. [REVIEW]Jennifer A. Mcmahon - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):865-867.
    Each chapter covers one topic and largely consists of brief summaries of arguments for and against various themes. The topic of the first chapter is whether and on what basis a film can be considered art. Photography is used as an analogy. The arguments range from considering the mechanical form of cinema as an obstacle to arthood to arguments considering cinema’s mechanical nature as essential to its arthood; the former by those who ground art in human agency, the latter by (...)
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  • The Ought‐Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.
    When it comes to the meanings of normative expressions, descriptivist theories and expressivist theories have distinct explanatory virtues. Noting this, and with the hope of not compromising on explanatory resources, hybrid semantic theories refuse to choose. Here, I examine how well the strategy works for Moorean open questions and associated is‐ought gaps. Though hybrid theorists typically rely on their expressivist resources for this explanandum, there is a type of open question that unadulterated expressivist theories can handle but hybrid theories cannot (...)
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  • Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):833-852.
    An apparently increasing number of philosophers take free will skepticism to pose a serious challenge to some of our practices. This must seem odd to many—why should anyone think that free will skepticism is relevant for our practices, when nobody seems to think that other canonical forms of philosophical skepticism are relevant for our practices? Part of the explanation may be epistemic, but here I focus on a metaethical explanation. Free will skepticism is special because it is compatible with ‘basic (...)
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  • Review of Justin Broackes, Ed., 'Iris Murdoch, Philosopher'. [REVIEW]Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):878-881.
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  • Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain.Robert Schroer Brendan O'sullivan - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.
    It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With regard to the (...)
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