- What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering.Herman Cappelen - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Conceptual Engineering and the Politics of Implementation.Matthieu Queloz & Friedemann Bieber - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):670-691.details
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Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.details
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(1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.details
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Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem.Matthieu Queloz - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1247-1278.details
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(2 other versions)The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.details
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Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23):1-37.details
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Functions.Larry Wright - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):139-168.details
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Speaker’s reference, stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers.Max Deutsch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3935-3957.details
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Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem.Sigurd Jorem - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):186-211.details
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Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy.Jennifer Nado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1507-1527.details
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(1 other version)Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:253-277.details
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How should we think about linguistic function?Amie L. Thomasson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch.Steffen Koch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2279-2291.details
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Conceptual Innovation, Function First.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):985-1002.details
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The ‘should’ in conceptual engineering.Mona Simion - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):914-928.details
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Amelioration vs. Perversion.Teresa Marques - 2020 - In Teresa Marques & Åsa Wikforss (eds.), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Inferentialist Conceptual Engineering.Sigurd Jorem & Guido Löhr - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The good, the bad and the insignificant—assessing concept functions for conceptual engineering.Sigurd Jorem - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-20.details
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Deflating the functional turn in conceptual engineering.Jared Riggs - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11555-11586.details
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(1 other version)Engineering concepts by engineering social norms: solving the implementation challenge.Christian Nimtz - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1716-1743.details
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Replacing Truth?Matti Eklund - 2014 - In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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weighing reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Engineering concepts by engineering social norms: solving the implementation challenge.Christian Nimtz - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-28.details
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Public justification.Kevin Vallier - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Changing the Subject.Timothy Sundell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):580-593.details
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The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata. [REVIEW]Andreas Matthias - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.details
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