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Epistemic Corruption and Education

Episteme 16 (2):220-235 (2019)

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  1. Developing Virtue and Rehabilitating Vice: Worries About Self-Cultivation and Self-Reform.Heather Battaly - 2016 - Journal of Moral Education 45 (2):207-222.
    Aristotelian virtue theorists have emphasized the role of the self in developing virtue and in rehabilitating vice. But this article argues that, as Aristotelians, we have placed too much emphasis on self-cultivation and self-reform. Self-cultivation is not required for developing virtue or vice. Nor will sophia-inspired self-reform jumpstart change in the vicious person. In each case, the external environment has an important role to play. One can unwittingly acquire virtues or vices from one’s environment. Likewise, a well-designed environment may be (...)
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  • Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Philosophy 78 (305):411-414.
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  • Epistemic Temperance.Paul Bloomfield - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):109-124.
    The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
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  • Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
    Vice epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of intellectual vices. Such vices include gullibility, dogmatism, prejudice, closed-mindedness, and negligence. These are intellectual character vices, that is, intellectual vices that are also character traits. I ask how the notion of an intellectual character vice should be understood, whether such vices exist, and how they might be epistemologically significant. The proposal is that intellectual character vices are intellectual character traits that impede effective and responsible inquiry. I (...)
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  • Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):503-527.
    In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
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  • Can There Be Institutional Virtues?Miranda Fricker - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
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  • Teaching and Truthfulness.David E. Cooper - 2008 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 27 (2-3):79-87.
    Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams, as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth, and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of (...)
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  • Collective Epistemic Virtues.Reza Lahroodi - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
    At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert's (...)
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  • On Diffidence: The Moral Psychology of Self-Belief.Richard Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (1):51–62.
    The language of self‐belief, including terms like shyness and diffidence, is complex and puzzling. The idea of self‐esteem in particular, which has been given fresh currency by recent interest in ‘personalised learning’, continues to create problems. I argue first that we need a ‘thicker’ and more subtle moral psychology of self‐belief; and, secondly, that there is a radical instability in the ideas and concepts in this area, an instability to which justice needs to be done. I suggest that aspects of (...)
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  • Epistemic Self-Indulgence.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):214-234.
    I argue in this essay that there is an epistemic analogue of moral self-indulgence. Section 1 analyzes Aristotle's notion of moral temperance, and its corresponding vices of self-indulgence and insensibility. Section 2 uses Aristotle's notion of moral self-indulgence as a model for epistemic self-indulgence. I argue that one is epistemically self-indulgent only if one either : (ESI1) desires, consumes, and enjoys appropriate and inappropriate epistemic objects; or (ESI2) desires, consumes, and enjoys epistemic objects at appropriate and inappropriate times; or (ESI3) (...)
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  • Education: The Engagement and its Frustration.Michael Oakeshott - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 5 (1):43–76.
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  • Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy: Epistemic Insensibility in the Seven Solutions and the REF.Heather Battaly - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):263-280.
    This article argues that the Seven Solutions in the US, and the Research Excellence Framework in the UK, manifest the vice of epistemic insensibility. Section I provides an overview of Aristotle's analysis of moral vice in people. Section II applies Aristotle's analysis to epistemic vice, developing an account of epistemic insensibility. In so doing, it contributes a new epistemic vice to the field of virtue epistemology. Section III argues that the (US) Seven Breakthrough Solutions and, to a lesser extent, the (...)
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  • Epistemic malevolence.Jason Baehr - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):189-213.
    Abstract: Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice—that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper—has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of "epistemic malevolence" makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue (...)
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  • Working Virtue. Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems.Rebecca L. Walker & Philip J. Ivanhoe - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4):779-780.
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  • Education: The Engagement and its Frustration.Michael Oakeshott - 1971 - Philosophy of Education 5 (1):43-76.
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  • On Diffidence: The Moral Psychology of Self-Belief.Richard Smith - 2006 - Philosophy of Education 40 (1):51-62.
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