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The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 186 (1):187-189.details
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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):921-946.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1994 - Princeton University Press.details
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Rationality and Reasons.Derek Parfit - unknowndetails
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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Reasoning in Stages.Nishi Shah & Matthew Silverstein - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):101-113.details
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A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
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Being in a Position to Know and Closure: Reply to Heylen.Sven Rosenkranz - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):68-72.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.details
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Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences.Christian Piller - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:155-182.details
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Review of Robert Nozick: The Nature of Rationality. [REVIEW]Donald C. Hubin - 1993 - Ethics 105 (3):659-662.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1995 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 6 (1):189-200.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution.Richard Moran - 1988 - Ratio 1 (2):135-51.details
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MAKING UP YOUR MIND: Self‐Interpretation and Self‐Constitution.Richard Moran - 2006 - Ratio 1 (2):135-151.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14.details
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Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):231-38.details
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Why Epistemic Permissions Don’t Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn.Thomas Kroedel - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (4):451–455.details
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The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.details
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The Lottery, the Preface, and Conditions on Permissible Belief.Thomas Kroedel - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):741–751.details
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The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn.Thomas Kroedel - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):103-111.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.details
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Why Be Rational&quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.details
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The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes.Thomas Kelly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.details
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The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes.Thomas Kelly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-196.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution of? -- A Question for Kroedel.Franz Huber - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):333-342.details
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Being in a Position to Know and Closure.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):63-67.details
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