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Gottvertrauen

Analyse & Kritik 25 (1):1-16 (2003)

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  1. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
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  • On the Emotional Character of Trust.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):171-189.
    Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...)
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  • Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2003 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust.Russell Hardin - 1992 - Analyse & Kritik 14 (2):152-176.
    Rational choice and other accounts of trust base it in objective assessments of the risks and benefits of trusting. But rational subjects must choose in the light of what knowledge they have, and that knowledge determines their capacities for trust. This is an epistemological issue, but not at the usual level of the philosophy of knowledge. Rather, it is an issue of pragmatic rationality for a given actor. It is commonly argued that trust is inherently embedded in iterated, thick relationships. (...)
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  • What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology.Cheshire Calhoun & Robert C. Solomon (eds.) - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and (...)
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  • Can We Trust Trust?Diego Gambetta - 1988 - In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell. pp. 213-237.
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