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Switch to: Citations
References in:
A proof-theoretic account of classical principles of truth
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (10):1009-1024 (2013)
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The article shows a simple way of calibrating the strength of the theory of positive induction, ${{\rm ID}^{*}_{1}}$ . Crucially the proof exploits the equivalence of ${\Sigma^{1}_{1}}$ dependent choice and ω-model reflection for ${\Pi^{1}_{2}}$ formulae over ACA 0. Unbeknown to the authors, D. Probst had already determined the proof-theoretic strength of ${{\rm ID}^{*}_{1}}$ in Probst, J Symb Log, 71, 721–746, 2006. |
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We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in (...) |
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To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation and conecessitation T and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is -inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give an analysis (...) |
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We present a theory VF of partial truth over Peano arithmetic and we prove that VF and ID 1 have the same arithmetical content. The semantics of VF is inspired by van Fraassen's notion of supervaluation. |
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This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth. |
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A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength. |
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