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  1. Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions.Derk Pereboom - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 asks how we might conceive of blame without retribution, and proposes an account of blame as moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as the moral reform of the wrongdoer and reconciliation in relationships. (...)
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  • Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):547-550.
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  • Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck (...)
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  • Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.
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  • Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
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  • Free Will Denial and Punishment.Kevin J. Murtagh - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (2):223-240.
    If we lack the kind of free will required for moral responsibility, what does that entail for the justification of particular punitive practices and punishment generally? Everyone seems to agree that incarceration can still be justified, and that retributive justifications of punishment will be unavailable. Beyond this, however, there is little agreement. In this article, I evaluate Derk Pereboom’s discussion of this issue in Living Without Free Will, and then articulate and defend my own positive position. In my view, significant (...)
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  • Persons, punishment, and free will skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by free will skeptics, and which can also be defended against the "using persons as mere means" objection. Free will skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive justifications must therefore endorse (...)
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  • Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio. [REVIEW]Saul Smilansky - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (3):353-367.
    How can hard determinism deal with the need to punish, when coupled with the obligation to be just? I argue that even though hard determinists might find it morally permissible to incarcerate wrongdoers apart from lawful society, they are committed to the punishment’s taking a very different form from common practice in contemporary Western societies. Hard determinists are in fact committed to what I will call funishment, instead of punishment. But, by its nature funishment is a practical reductio of hard (...)
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  • Insanity Defenses.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy - 2011 - In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 299--334.
    We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.
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  • The Metaphysics of Free Will: an Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373-381.
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  • Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Ethics 94 (2):326-327.
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  • A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):617-636.
    This paper features Derk Pereboom’s replies to commentaries by Victor Tadros and Saul Smilansky on his non-retributive, incapacitation-focused proposal for treatment of dangerous criminals; by Michael McKenna on his manipulation argument against compatibilism about basic desert and causal determination; and by Alfred R. Mele on his disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.
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  • The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In Watson G. (ed.), Free will. 2nd edition. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 5-24.
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  • Against Moral Responsibility.Bruce N. Waller - 2011 - MIT Press.
    In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. Waller argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, he contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. Waller (...)
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  • Free Will and Reasonable Doubt.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):131-140.
    The goal of this paper is to explain and defend the following argument: (1) If it can be reasonably doubted that someone had free will with respect to some action, then it is a requirement of justice to refrain from doing serious retributive harm to him in response to that action. (2) Anyone who believes the free will debate to be philosophically valuable must accept that it can be reasonably doubted that anyone ever has free will. (3) Therefore, anyone who (...)
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  • The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our (...)
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  • The implications of free will skepticism for establishing criminal liability.Elizabeth Shaw - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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  • The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Free Will, Responsibility, and Crime: An Introduction.Ken Levy - 2019 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both - that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position. So they tend to opt for two other theories: "responsibility skepticism" and "compatibilism". (...)
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  • Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.
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  • Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Mind 95 (377):127-129.
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  • Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):271-274.
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  • The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (2):124-125.
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  • Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.
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