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A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):531-575.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Changing the modal context.John Cantwell - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):331-351.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1999 - In William Kingdon Clifford (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals.Timothy Williamson - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):349-377.details
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One's Modus Ponens: Modality, Coherence and Logic.Una Stojnić - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):167-214.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Modus Ponens Under the Restrictor View.Moritz Schulz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (6):1001-1028.details
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Trivializing Informational Consequence.Paolo Santorio - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):297-320.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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Belief Norms & Blindspots.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.details
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Vann McGee's counterexample to modus ponens.Christian Piller - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.details
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The Ambiguity of Quantifiers.Francesco Paoli - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):313-330.details
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Belief, normativity and the constitution of agency.Emer O'Hagan - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.details
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Chancy Modus Ponens.Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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The truth Norm of belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.details
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Not a Counterexample to Modus Ponens.E. J. Lowe - 1987 - Analysis 47 (1):44 - 47.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.details
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Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.details
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Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.details
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What we can learn from how trivalent conditionals avoid triviality.Daniel Lassiter - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1087-1114.details
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Uncertain Inference.Henry E. Kyburg Jr & Choh Man Teng - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.details
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Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.details
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On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens.Bernard D. Katz - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404.details
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Rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):129 - 145.details
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Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.details
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A bayesian theory of rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330.details
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The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief.James Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.details
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The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference.James Hawthorne & David Makinson - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):247-297.details
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Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.details
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