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Groups with minds of their own.Philip Pettit - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Groups as Agents.Deborah Tollefsen - 2015 - Malden, MA: Polity.details
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Computing machinery and intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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Group Responsibility.Christian List - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Natural Ontological Attitude.Arthur I. Fine - 1984 - In Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California. pp. 261--77.details
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Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.Stuart Jonathan Russell & Peter Norvig (eds.) - 1995 - Prentice-Hall.details
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The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.Carol Rovane - 1997 - Princeton University Press.details
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The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View.Raimo Tuomela - 2007 - New York, US: Oup Usa.details
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The philosophy of sociality: The shared point of view * by Raimo Tuomela. [REVIEW]Raimo Tuomela - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):587-589.details
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Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.details
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Killer robots.Robert Sparrow - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):62–77.details
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Can a Corporation be Worthy of Moral Consideration?Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 159 (1):253-265.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.Carol Anne Rovane - 1997 - Princeton University Press.details
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Ontological relativity.W. V. O. Quine - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (7):185-212.details
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Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.details
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Responsibility incorporated.Philip Pettit - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):171-201.details
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Group agency and supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.details
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From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights.Avia Pasternak - 2017 - Law and Ethics of Human Rights 11 (1):135-159.details
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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Hugh J. McCann & M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230.details
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The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata. [REVIEW]Andreas Matthias - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.details
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The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata.Andreas Matthias - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.details
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Responsibility voids.Matthew Braham & Martin VanHees - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):6-15.details
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What is it Like to be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2016 - Noûs:295-319.details
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The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.details
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Artificial agents among us: Should we recognize them as agents proper?Migle Laukyte - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1):1-17.details
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Human rights without human supremacism.Will Kymlicka - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):763-792.details
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Responsibility for Killer Robots.Johannes Himmelreich - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):731-747.details
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Moral Responsibility of Robots and Hybrid Agents.Raul Hakli & Pekka Mäkelä - 2019 - The Monist 102 (2):259-275.details
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On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.details
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Artificial Moral Agents: Moral Mentors or Sensible Tools?Fabio Fossa - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology (2):1-12.details
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Responsibility Voids and Cooperation.Hein Duijf - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (4):434-460.details
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Machines, plants and animals: The origins of agency. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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On the agency of certain collective entities: An argument from "normative autonomy".David Copp - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):194–221.details
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Filling Collective Duty Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (11):573-591.details
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Collective Responsibility Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):943-954.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.details
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Doubt and the Algorithm: On the Partial Accounts of Machine Learning.Louise Amoore - 2019 - Theory, Culture and Society 36 (6):147-169.details
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Ai: Its Nature and Future.Margaret A. Boden - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Michael Bratman - 2014 - New York, NY: Oup Usa.details
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Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents.Raimo Tuomela - 2013 - New York, US: Oup Usa.details
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Superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies.Nick Bostrom (ed.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.details
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Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.details
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Polity.details
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