- Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons.Barry Maguire & Errol Lord - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oup Usa.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
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Contextualising Knowledge: Epistemology and Semantics.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Concept of Moral Obligation.Lou Goble - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):242-244.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.details
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Reason without Reasons For.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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The Realm of Rights by Judith Jarvis Thomson. [REVIEW]Carl Wellman - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (6):326-329.details
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Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Subjective rightness: Holly M. Smith.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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The preface paradox.Sharon Ryan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):293-307.details
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The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Review of Donald Regan: Utilitarianism and co-operation. [REVIEW]William Nelson - 1982 - Ethics 92 (4):751-753.details
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A Defense of the Objective/subjective Moral Ought Distinction.Kristian Olsen - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):351-373.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Knowledge Dethroned.Andy Mueller & Jacob Ross - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):283-296.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.details
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Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):31-38.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent.Benjamin Kiesewitter - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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