Fifteen dialogues drawn from the highly acclaimed BBC series review the tenets and theories of moral philosophy, poliitcal philosophy, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science.

Die Parole von der Postmoderne ist missverständlich und wurde dennoch unumgänglich. Wolfgang Welsch spricht von einer "Magie des falschen Namens". Der Postmoderne-Diskurs ist allzu oft diffus statt präzis und droht in Beliebigkeit und Indifferenz abzugleiten. Anders in diesem Buch. Der Autor rekonstruiert die Geschichte des Ausdrucks und entwickelt einen Begriff von Postmoderne, der sich bezüglich der Literatur, der Architektur und der anderen Künste ebenso bewährt, wie er neuere Entwicklungen der Wissenschaftstheorie reflektiert, soziologische Fragen aufnimmt, Veränderungen in der Lebenswelt diagnostiziert und (...) die philosophischen Dimensionen des Themas durchleuchtet. Wolfgang Welsch blickt als Philosoph über die Grenzen seiner Disziplin hinaus und gibt ein Gesamtbild unserer Zeit. Er tut das in der Form eines Pluralitätskonzepts, das Unterschiede nicht tilgt, sondern freigibt und verteidigt. Welsch begegnet den postmodernen Tendenzen mit Aufgeschlossenheit, ohne ein modisches Verhältnis zu ihnen einzunehmen. Seine Version von Postmoderne ist problembewusst. Am Ende entwickelt er eine Vernunftkonzeption, die - Jahren der Vernunftkritik und als Ausweg aus ihr - mit Pluralität im Sinn von Vernünftigkeit und Gerechtigkeit umzugehen erlaubt. (shrink)

In contrast to earlier accounts of the epistemic significance of narrative, it is argued that narrative is important in natural scientific knowledge. To recognize this, we must understand narrative not as a literary form in which knowledge is written, but as the temporal organization of the understanding of practical activity. Scientific research is a social practice, whereby researchers structure the narrative context in which past work is interpreted and significant possibilities for further work are projected. This narrative field displays a (...) constant tension between a need for a coherent, shared understanding of the field and the incoherence threatened by divergent projects and interpretations. The account has three parts. First, a summary of the general account of the narrative intelligibility of action which underlies the proffered view of narrative in science. This account is then applied to understanding how scientific work acquires significance, and how the scientific literature is constructed and read. Finally, it is shown how this account should transform our understanding of the unity of science, and it is suggested how it can help undercut various realist and anti?realist interpretations of scientific knowledge, while also challenging the ironic stance which many recent sociologists adopt toward the global legitimation of science attempted by many philosophers. (shrink)

Modernism in the philosophy of science demands a unified story about what makes an inquiry scientific (or a successful science). Fine's "natural ontological attitude" (NOA) is "postmodern" in joining trust in local scientific practice with suspicion toward any global interpretation of science to legitimate or undercut that trust. I consider four readings of this combination of trust and suspicion and their consequences for the autonomy and cultural credibility of the sciences. Three readings take respectively Fine's trusting attitude, his emphasis upon (...) local practice, and his antiessentialism about science as most fundamental to NOA. A fourth, more adequate reading, prompted by recent feminist interpretations of science, offers less restrictive readings of both Fine's trust and his suspicion toward approaching science with "ready-made philosophical engines" (Fine 1986b, 177). (shrink)

The debate over scientific or critical realism is characterized by confusion, which I claim is a result of approaching the issue from both modern and ‘postmodern’ perspectives. Modern thought is characterized by foundationalism in epistemology and representationalism in philosophy of language, while holism in epistemology and the theory of meaning as use in philosophy of language are postmodern. Typical forms of scientific realism (which seek referents for theoretical terms or correspondence accounts of the truth of scientific theories) are positions at (...) home only in a modern framework. Postmodern presuppositions of other participants in the debate account for the ability of opponents to talk past one another. (shrink)

The realist programme has degenerated by now to the point where it is quite beyond salvage. A token of this degeneration is that there are altogether too many realisms. It is as though by splitting into a confusing array of types and kinds, realism has hoped that some one variety might yet escape extinct. I shall survey the debate, and some of these realisms, below. Here I would just point out the obvious; that in so far as the successes of (...) science mount while realism continues to decline we must conclude that scientific success lends no support to realism. Since it is unlikely to support anti-realism, we have some reason to suspect that the philosophical debate over realism does not concern issues that can be settled by developments in the sciences, no matter how successful science may be. Further, since that success grounds a culture of acceptance for science and its entities, we have reason to believe that the existence of those entities is also not actually the issue that concerns realism. Afortiori, it is not the issue that concerns anti-realism either; nor, I might add, is anti-realism the winner in the philosophical debate that realism has lost. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this book it explores science and technology, makes connections between these epistemic, cultural, and political trends, and develops profound insights into the nature of our postmodernity.