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the pyrrhonian problematic.Markus Lammenranta - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 9--33.details
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Relying on others: an essay in epistemology.Sanford Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.details
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Knowing from testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):432–448.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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Persistent Disagreement.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Disagreement Defended.Earl Conee - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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Peerage.Earl Conee - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):313-323.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The argument from moral disagreement.William Tolhurst - 1987 - Ethics 97 (3):610-621.details
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Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.details
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Normative ethics and the prospects of an empirical contribution to assessment of moral disagreement and moral realism.Andrew Sneddon - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):447-455.details
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The philosophy of common sense.H. Sidgwick - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):145-158.details
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Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):251-268.details
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Shifting the burden of proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.details
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Epistemic and dialectical regress.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.details
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Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry.Marc Moffett - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):352-367.details
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McGrath on Moral Knowledge.Sarah Mcgrath - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.details
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The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.details
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The Pyrrhonian Argument from Possible Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):148-161.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Disagreement, Skepticism, and the Dialectical Conception of Justification.Markus Lammenranta - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):3-17.details
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Rejoinder to McGrath.Nathan L. King - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:243-246.details
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McGrath on Moral Knowledge.Nathan L. King - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.details
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Religious diversity and its challenges to religious belief.Nathan L. King - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):830-853.details
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McGrath on Moral Knowledge.Nathan L. King - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.details
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Reliabilism in philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.details
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Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG. [REVIEW]Sanford Goldberg - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):582-585.details
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Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.Bryan Frances - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1-21.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Plantinga on Exclusivism.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):85-90.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.details
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