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Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-53.details
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Papineau on etiological teleosemantics for beliefs.Joseph Mendola - 2006 - Ratio 19 (3):305-320.details
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An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.details
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What do frogs really believe?Nicholas Agar - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):1-12.details
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On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective.Dan Ryder - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-145.details
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Useless content.Ruth Millikan - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.details
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