- (1 other version)Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto & Mark Jago - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Jago.details
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Impossible Worlds.Franz Berto & Mark Jago - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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On counterpossibles.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):327-353.details
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Counterpossible Non-vacuity in Scientific Practice.Peter Tan - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (1):32-60.details
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Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2019 - New York City, New York, USA: Routledge.details
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Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.details
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Epistemic luck and logical necessities: armchair luck revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Bojan Borstner Smiljana Gartner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.details
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(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.details
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(1 other version)Safety-Based Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.details
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Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination.Francesco Berto - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1277-1297.details
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Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.details
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Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability.Matthias Jenny - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):530-560.details
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Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.details
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Granularity problems.Jens Christian Bjerring & Wolfgang Schwarz - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):22-37.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.details
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The problem of true-true counterfactuals.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):276-285.details
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(1 other version)Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.details
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A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.details
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Nozick on Knowledge.Saul A. Kripke - 2011 - In Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.details
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Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013):en ligne.details
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Remarks on counterpossibles.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):639-660.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.details
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Safety, sensitivity and differential support.José L. Zalabardo - 2017 - Synthese 197 (12):5379-5388.details
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Counterpossibles and Similarity.David Vander Laan - 2004 - In Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian themes: the philosophy of David K. Lewis. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 258-275.details
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Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.details
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Who's Afraid of Impossible Worlds?Edwin D. Mares - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):516-526.details
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Armchair luck: Apriority, intellection and epistemic luck. [REVIEW]Nenad Miščević - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.details
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(1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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(1 other version)How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.details
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(1 other version)Safety and the True–True Problem.Jeffrey W. Roland Jon Cogburn - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Ethics 94 (2):326-327.details
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(1 other version)Safety and the True–True Problem.Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.details
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