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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief.John Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.details
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Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Wondering about what you know.Avery Archer - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):anx162.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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Asking questions: using meaningful structures to imply ignorance.Robert Fiengo - 2007 - Oxford ;: University Press.details
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Moral dilemmas.Terrance McConnell - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2018 - In João Luis Pereira Ourique (ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy. pp. 77-78.details
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One Kind of Asking.Dennis Whitcomb - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).details
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The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.details
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On negative yes/no questions.Maribel Romero & Chung-Hye Han - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (5):609-658.details
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Applying pragmatics to epistemology.Kent Bach - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.details
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Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Intraspecies impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.details
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The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief.James Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.details
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Selected writings.George Edward Moore - 1993 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry by Isaac Levi. [REVIEW]Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (8):425-432.details
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