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  1. The Metaphysical Equivalence Of Three And Four Dimensionalism.Kristie Miller - 2004 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):91-117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
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  • Troubles with Time Travel.William Grey - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (1):55-70.
    Talk about time travel is puzzling even if it isn't obviously contradictory. Philosophers however are divided about whether time travel involves empirical paradox or some deeper metaphysical incoherence. It is suggested that time travel requires a Parmenidean four-dimensionalist metaphysical conception of the world in time. The possibility of time travel is addressed (mainly) from within a Parmenidean metaphysical framework, which is accepted by David Lewis in his defence of the coherence of time travel. It is argued that time travel raises (...)
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  • The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
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  • The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • Persistence, Parts, and Presentism.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):421-438.
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  • Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity.Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539.
    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate a relativistic (...)
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  • Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals.Theodore Sider - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):115 - 138.
    In no possible world does a time traveler succeed in killing herearlier self before she ever enters a time machine. So if many,many time travelers went back in time trying to kill theirunprotected former selves, the time travelers would fail inmany strange, coincidental ways, slipping on bananapeels, killing the wrong victim, and so on. Such cases producedoubts about time travel. How could ``coincidences'' beguaranteed to happen? And wouldn't the certainty of coincidentalfailure imply that time travelers are not free to killtheir (...)
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • Four-Dimensional Objects.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245--255.
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  • Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW]Theodore Sider - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):45-48.
    Locke’s view that continuants are numerically distinct from their constituting hunks of matter is popular enough to be called the “standard account”.1 It was given its definitive contemporary statement by David Wiggins in Sameness and Substance2, and has been defended by many since. Baker’s interesting book contributes new arguments for this view, a new definition of ‘constitution’, and a sustained application to persons and human animals. Much of what she says develops this view in new and important ways. But in (...)
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  • On The Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  • Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
    Precis of my book by this title, for a symposium.
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  • Relativistic Objects.Yuri Balashov - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):644-662.
    I offer an argument in defense of four-dimensionalism, the view that objects are temporally, as well as spatially extended. The argument is of the inference-to-the-best-explanation variety and is based on relativistic considerations. It deals with the situation in which one and the same object has different three-dimensional shapes at the same time and proceeds by asking what sort of thing it must be in order to present itself in such different ways in various "perspectives" (associated with moving reference frames) without (...)
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  • On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
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  • Constitution is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.
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  • Time Travel: How Not to Defuse the Principal Paradox.Timothy Chambers - 1999 - Ratio 12 (3):296–301.
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  • The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis.E. J. Lowe - 1988 - Analysis 48 (2):72-77.
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  • Symposia Papers: Four-Dimensional Objects.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245-255.
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  • The Statue and the Clay.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):149-173.
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  • Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?Denis Robinson - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):299 – 319.
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  • Why Constitution is Not Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599.
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  • Persistence and Presentism.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126.
    The ‘friends of temporal parts’ and their opponents disagree about how things persist through time. The former, who hold what is sometimes called a ‘4D’ theory of persistence, typically claim that all objects that last for any period of time are spread out through time in the same way that spatially extended objects are spread out through space — a different part for each region that the object fills. David Lewis calls this manner of persisting ‘perdurance’. The opposing, ‘3D’ theory (...)
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  • The Ontology of Physical Objects.Mark Heller - 1990 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):122-126.
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  • Spatially Coinciding Objects.Fred Doepke - 1982 - Ratio:10--24.
    Following Wiggins’ seminal article, On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time, this article presents the first comprehensive account of the relation of material constitution, an asymmetrical, transitive relation which totally orders distinct ‘entities’ (individuals, pluralities or masses of stuff) which ‘spatially coincide.’ Their coincidence in space is explained by a recursive definition of ‘complete-composition’, weaker than strict mereological indiscernibility, which also explains the variety of logically independent similarities in such cases. This account is ‘analytical’, dealing with ‘putative’ (...)
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  • The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter.Mark Heller - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):220-224.
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  • Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?Josh Parsons - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is (...)
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  • Persistence and Spacetime.Yuri Balashov - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Background and assumptions. Persistence and philosophy of time ; Atomism and composition ; Scope ; Some matters of methodology -- Persistence, location, and multilocation in spacetime. Endurance, perdurance, exdurance : some pictures ; More pictures ; Temporal modification and the "problem of temporary intrinsics" ; Persistence, location and multilocation in generic spacetime ; An alternative classification -- Classical and relativistic spacetime. Newtonian spacetime ; Neo-Newtonian (Galilean) spacetime ; Reference frames and coordinate systems ; Galilean transformations in spacetime ; Special relativistic (...)
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  • Constitution Is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 44-62.
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  • Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
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  • The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis. E. Lowe - 1988 - Analysis 48 (2):72-77.
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  • Is There a Problem About Persistence?Mark Johnston & Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 61:107-155.
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  • Persistence and Space-Time.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):321-340.
    Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being "wholly present" at all moments of time at which they exist? Or do they persist by having distinct "temporal segments" confined to the corresponding times? Are objects three-dimensional entities extended in space, but not in time? Or are they four-dimensional spacetime "worms"? These are matters of intense debate, which is now driven by concerns (...)
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  • On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel.Paul Horwich - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):432-444.
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