Reflections on the linkage between and the provocative force of problems in the analogy of city and soul, in the simile-bound characterization of the Good, and in the performative tension between what Plato has Socrates say about the philosopher's disinclination to descend into the city and what he has Socrates do in descending into the Piraeus to teach, with a closing recognition of the analogy between Socratic teaching and Platonic writing.

The General Account of Pleasure in Plato's Philebus THOMAS M. TUOZZO 1. INTRODUCTION DOES PLATO IN THE Philebus present a single general account of pleasure, applicable to all of the kinds of pleasure he discusses in that dialogue? Gosling and Taylor think not;' Dorothea Frede has recently reasserted a version of the contrary, traditional view. 2 The traditional view, I shall argue in this essay, is correct: the Philebus does contain a general account of pleasure applicable to all pleasures. Nonetheless, (...) Gosling and Taylor have pointed to a real difficulty with the traditional view, a difficulty that has never been adequately ad- dressed. To show how it can be overcome will involve showing that Plato's account of pleasure, and his analyses of other phenomena of moral psychol- ogy in the Philebus, are more complex and subtle than has often been realized. Gosling and Taylor offer two considerations in support of their view: Socrates insists against Protarchus that different pleasures can be "most oppo- site" to each other, which suggests that no single account can apply to them all,s and Socrates does not indicate how the most likely candidate for a general account of pleasure, one involving the restoration of a natural har- ,j. c. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure , 14o: "It seems clear that in the Philebus Plato has no general formula to encapsulate the nature of pleasure .... " So, too, C. Hampton, Pleasure,.. (shrink)

For much of its history, philosophy was not merely a theoretical discipline but a way of life, an "art of living." This practical aspect of philosophy has been much less dominant in modernity than it was in ancient Greece and Rome, when philosophers of all stripes kept returning to Socrates as a model for living. The idea of philosophy as an art of living has survived in the works of such major modern authors as Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Each of (...) these writers has used philosophical discussion as a means of establishing what a person is and how a worthwhile life is to be lived. In this wide-ranging, brilliantly written account, Alexander Nehamas provides an incisive reevaluation of Socrates' place in the Western philosophical tradition and shows the importance of Socrates for Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Why does each of these philosophers—each fundamentally concerned with his own originality—return to Socrates as a model? The answer lies in the irony that characterizes the Socrates we know from the Platonic dialogues. Socratic irony creates a mask that prevents a view of what lies behind. How Socrates led the life he did, what enabled or inspired him, is never made evident. No tenets are proposed. Socrates remains a silent and ambiguous character, forcing readers to come to their own conclusions about the art of life. This, Nehamas shows, is what allowed Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault to return to Socrates as a model without thereby compelling them to imitate him. This highly readable, erudite study argues for the importance of the tradition within Western philosophy that is best described as "the art of living" and casts Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault as the three major modern representatives of this tradition. Full of original ideas and challenging associations, this work will offer new ways of thinking about the philosophers Nehamas discusses and about the discipline of philosophy itself. (shrink)

For much of its history, philosophy was not merely a theoretical discipline but a way of life, an "art of living." This practical aspect of philosophy has been much less dominant in modernity than it was in ancient Greece and Rome, when philosophers of all stripes kept returning to Socrates as a model for living. The idea of philosophy as an art of living has survived in the works of such major modern authors as Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Each of (...) these writers has used philosophical discussion as a means of establishing what a person is and how a worthwhile life is to be lived. In this wide-ranging, brilliantly written account, Alexander Nehamas provides an incisive reevaluation of Socrates' place in the Western philosophical tradition and shows the importance of Socrates for Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Why does each of these philosophers—each fundamentally concerned with his own originality—return to Socrates as a model? The answer lies in the irony that characterizes the Socrates we know from the Platonic dialogues. Socratic irony creates a mask that prevents a view of what lies behind. How Socrates led the life he did, what enabled or inspired him, is never made evident. No tenets are proposed. Socrates remains a silent and ambiguous character, forcing readers to come to their own conclusions about the art of life. This, Nehamas shows, is what allowed Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault to return to Socrates as a model without thereby compelling them to imitate him. This highly readable, erudite study argues for the importance of the tradition within Western philosophy that is best described as "the art of living" and casts Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault as the three major modern representatives of this tradition. Full of original ideas and challenging associations, this work will offer new ways of thinking about the philosophers Nehamas discusses and about the discipline of philosophy itself. (shrink)

A close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge that it must (...) be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires. (shrink)

Provides a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories on the nature of pleasure, and of its value and rolein human lfie, from the ealriest times down to the period of Epicurus and the early Stoics.

In The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies, Roslyn Weiss argues that the Socratic paradoxes—no one does wrong willingly, virtue is knowledge, and all the virtues are one—are best understood as Socrates’ way of combating sophistic views: ...

Explores interpretations of Plato by Heidegger, Derrida, Irigaray, Cavarero, and Gadamer.

"This excellent work... deserves the serious consideration of all who are interested in contemporary philosophy as well as those who concern themselves with ancient philosophy, especially Plato." —Review of Metaphysics In Chorology, John Sallis takes up one of the most enigmatic discourses in the history of philosophy. Plato's discourse on the chora—the chorology—forms the pivotal moment in the Timaeus. The implications of the chorology are momentous and communicate with many of the most decisive issues in contemporary philosophical discussions.

Miller begins by contrasting two ways of regarding Plato’s Statesman. According to "the standard view," this late work is more a treatise than a dialogue. Here Plato’s doctrinal intent clearly overwhelmed his flair for dramatic invention. His positive teaching is presented by a stranger; Socrates the questioner is given a minor role. According to Miller, on the other hand, the Statesman is no less than any other Platonic dialogue a unity whose form and content, dramatic situation and argument, communicative function (...) and "philosophic substance," are internally related. Furthermore, the doctrine it presents is adequately understood only if one regards it both as a mean between truth and ignorance about what is in question and as a means to the truth still in question. The dialogue’s "surface" and "subsurface" content, too, are internally related. (shrink)

An examination on the one hand of Aristotle's report in Metaphysics A6 of Plato's teachings regarding the One, the dyad of the Great and the Small, and mathematical intermediates and on the other hand of key passages in Plato's Parmenides. I argue that we can find in those passages exhibitions of the teachings Aristotle reports and that these exhibitions help us to understand those teachings.

This dissertation is the documentation of a discovery that most of the Plato dialogues generally considered authentic are composed according to the dictates of one and the same structure. It is comprised of an introduction , and three main sections named the protrepsis, the incursion, and the exegesis. In addition, a principle of internal tripartition is in play, such that each main section excepting the incursion is subdivided into three sections, which in turn are again subdivided into three subsections, which (...) are again usually further so subdivided. The incursion section is divided into two parts, each of which is further subdivided as above. ;While the tripartite structure is often obvious, whatever significance it may have is not so clear. The significance of the main sections, while varying some from one type of dialogue to another, is much clearer. The introduction gives concrete exemplification of the more abstract ideas drawn out of it in the main dialogue. In the protrepsis, a prevailing way of thinking about a philosophical topic is presented and, in the earlier dialogues, refuted. In the incursion, philosophical considerations unusual for the times are introduced, so as to put the substance of the protrepsis in an altogether new light. Socrates grasps the import of this convention-shattering development, but the respondent does not. In the exegesis, the main protagonist is shown airing the consequences of the new philosophical grounding of the issue in question, while the respondent insulates himself from that understanding and sinks back into his former ways. In general, the dialogue between protagonist and respondent represents a dialogue between philosophically and sophistically disposed persons on the issue at hand. ;The dissertation itself is in four parts. In the General Introduction, the structure and interpretation resulting from structural understanding are discussed in detail. The Crito, Parmenides, Timaeus, and Laws are shown to be significantly incomplete--a fact having considerable bearing on their interpretation. The Menexenus is seen to be a work of significantly different structure. Problems with the structure of the Cratylus are discussed. The Hippias Major is shown to be structurally complete and regular, and the Alcibiades I almost so. This work may have some bearing on determination of authenticity. The General Introduction ends with discussions of the subsequent fate of dialogue structure, and on the theme, Plato today. ;In the second section of the dissertation, the turning points between the first two and second two sections of all the dialogues are established. In the third section, all the introductions are discussed in detail, and grouped by types. In the fourth section, all the protrepses are also so treated. The work of detailed analysis of the incursion and exegesis sections, as well as the turning points between them, remains to be done. (shrink)