Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Changing the Past.Peter Van Inwagen - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:3-40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Prudence and Past Selves.Dale Dorsey - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1901-1925.
    An important platitude about prudential rationality is that I should not refuse to sacrifice a smaller amount of present welfare for the sake of larger future benefits. I ought, in other words, to treat my present and future as of equal prudential significance. The demands of prudence are less clear, however, when it comes to one’s past selves. In this paper, I argue that past benefits are possible in two ways, and that this fact cannot be easily accommodated by traditional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Agency, Experience, and Future Bias.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):237-245.
    Most of us are hedonically future-biased: other things being equal, we prefer pains to be in the past and pleasures to be in the future. Recently, various authors have argued that future bias is irrational, and that we should be temporally neutral instead. I argue that instead of temporal neutrality, the putative counterexamples and the rationales offered for them only motivate a more narrow principle I call Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act on the basis of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Theories of Time and the Asymmetry in Human Attitudes.Gal Yehezkel - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):68-83.
    An important aspect of the debate between the A-theory and the B-theory of time relates to the supposed implications of each for some of the most basic human attitudes and stances. The asymmetry in our attitudes towards past and future events in our life (pleasant and unpleasant), and towards the temporal limits of our existence, that is, toward birth and death, is supposedly considered differently by the two theories. I argue that our attitudes are neither justified nor discredited by anything (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Back to the Unchanging Past.Sam Baron - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):129-147.
    The standard philosophical view of time travel has it that time travelers cannot change the past. It has been argued by some that the standard view is false, and that this can be shown using a two-dimensional model of time. I defend the standard view against this attack. I show, first, that the addition of a second temporal dimension does not provide a model of changing the past and, second, that neither does the addition of n temporal dimensions for any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’: The Evolutionary Story.Heather Dyke & James Maclaurin - 2002 - Ratio 15 (3):276–292.
    If, as the new tenseless theory of time maintains, there are no tensed facts, then why do our emotional lives seem to suggest that there are? This question originates with Prior’s ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ problem, and still presents a significant challenge to the new B-theory of time. We argue that this challenge has more dimensions to it than has been appreciated by those involved in the debate so far. We present an analysis of the challenge, showing the different questions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Time Travel and Changing the Past: (Or How to Kill Yourself and Live to Tell the Tale).G. C. Goddu - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):16–32.
    According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future.William Lane Craig - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):515-537.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton & Christian Tarsney - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11327-11349.
    Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants exhibit significantly less (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • In Defense of the Compossibility of Presentism and Time Travel.Thomas Hall - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):141-159.
    In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist’s model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Appropriate Emotions and the Metaphysics of Time.Olley Pearson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1945-1961.
    Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be translated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view and therefore is not sufficient to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future.Kristie Miller - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):173-191.
    Here are some intuitions we have about the nature of space and time. There is something fundamentally different about the past, present, and future. What is definitive of the past is that the past events are fixed. What is definitive of the future is that future events are not fixed. What is definitive of the present is that it marks the objective ontological border between the past and the future and, by doing so, instantiates a particularly salient phenomenological property of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Travelling in A- and B- Time.Theodore Sider - 2005 - The Monist 88 (3):329-335.
    Some say that presentism precludes time travel into the past since it implies that the past does not exist, but this is a bad argument. Presentism says that only currently existing entities exist, and that the only properties and relations those entities instantiate are those that they currently instantiate. This does in a sense imply that the past does not exist. But if that precluded time travel into the past, it would also preclude the one-second-per-second “time travel” into the future (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel.S. Keller & M. Nelson - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):333 – 345.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • The Necessity of Time Travel (On Pain of Indeterminacy).Matthew H. Slater - 2005 - The Monist 88 (3):362-369.
    There is a tension between the “growing block” account of time (closed past, open future) and the possibility of backwards time travel. If Tim the time traveler can someday travel backwards through time, then he has (in a certain sense) already been. He might discover this fact before (in another sense) he goes. Hence a dilemma: it seems that either Tim’s future is determined in an odd way or cases of (temporary) ontic indeterminate identity are possible. Either Tim cannot avoid (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time.Caspar Hare - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):350-373.
    This is about the metaphysics of the self and ethical egoism. It can serve as a preview for my manuscript-in-progress below.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias Toward the Future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):148-163.
    It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Stillness of Time and Philosophical Equanimity.George Schlesinger - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (3):145 - 159.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Time Travel and the Open Future.Kristie Miller - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):223 - 232.
    In this paper, I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open futureobjective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • No Time Travel for Presentists.Steven D. Hales - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
    In the present paper, I offer a new argument to show that presentism about time is incompatible with time travel. Time travel requires leaving the present, which, under presentism, contains all of reality. Therefore to leave the present moment is to leave reality entirely; i.e. to go out of existence. Presentist “time travel” is therefore best seen as a form of suicide, not as a mode of transportation. Eternalists about time do not face the same difficulty, and time travel is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On Whether To Prefer Pain to Pass.Tom Dougherty - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):521-537.
    Most of us are “time-biased” in preferring pains to be past rather than future and pleasures to be future rather than past. However, it turns out that if you are risk averse and time-biased, then you can be turned into a “pain pump”—in order to insure yourself against misfortune, you will take a series of pills which leaves you with more pain and better off in no respect. Since this vulnerability seems rationally impermissible, while time-bias and risk aversion seem rationally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • A Two-Dimensional Passage Model of Time for Time Travel.Jack W. Meiland - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):153 - 173.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Thank Goodness That's Over.A. N. Prior - 1959 - Philosophy 34 (128):12 - 17.
    In a pair of very important papers, namely “Space, Time and Individuals” in the Journal of Philosophy for October 1955 and “The Indestructibility and Immutability of Substances” in Philosophical Studies for April 1956, Professor N. L. Wilson began something which badly needed beginning, namely the construction of a logically rigorous “substance-language” in which we talk about enduring and changing individuals as we do in common speech, as opposed to the “space-time” language favoured by very many mathematical logicians, perhaps most notably (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell.Peter Forrest - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
    In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • Uniform Grounding of Truth and the Growing Block Theory: A Reply to Heathwood.Peter Forrest - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):161–163.
    Chris Heathwood requires the sentence 'Caesar was conscious when he crossed the Rubicon' to be made true in much the same way as 'Caesar was wet when he crossed the Rubicon'. Yet because the Growing Block theorist is committed to the zombiedom of the past,the former is not made true by past objects, although the latter is. Heathwood demands a uniform account of the grounding of truths and he will be given a uniform account. But we should exercise care in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Necessary Existents.Timothy Williamson - 2002 - In A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, thought, and language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-251.
    It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   151 citations  
  • Back to the Present: Defending Presentist Time Travel.Paul Richard Daniels - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (33):469 - 484.
    Here I defend the compatibility of presentism and time travel against a few objections. Keller and Nelson argue that, if presentism is at all plausible, presentism and time travel are as compatible as eternalism and time travel. But Miller and Sider are not convinced. I reply that for their concerns to have merit, Miller and Sider must assume presentists are committed to positions they need not be; I explain why presentists are not so committed and, in the process, defend Keller (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Presentists Can Believe in Closed Timelike Curves.Bradley Monton - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):199–202.
    It is often thought that presentism is incompatible with time travel. I will argue that this common view is incorrect. Specifically, I will argue that presentism is compatible with some stories that involve closed timelike curves, and that some of these stories are time-travel stories.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A Puzzle About Other-Directed Time-Bias 1.Caspar Hare - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):269-277.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? ‘Sometimes yes, sometimes no’—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Against Time Bias.Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):947-970.
    Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While philosophers have tended to think that near bias is a rational defect, almost no one finds future bias objectionable. In this essay, we argue that this hybrid (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • A Puzzle About Other-Directed Time-Bias.Caspar Hare - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):269 – 277.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations