- (2 other versions)Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity : A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge. pp. 110-129.details
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(1 other version)Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity.William FitzPatrick - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Robust ethical realism, non-naturalism, and normativity.William Joseph FitzPatrick - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:159-205.details
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(1 other version)A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A Sensible Subjectivism?David Wiggins - 1987 - Blackwell.details
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Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value.David Wiggins - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral status of stem cells.Agata Sagan & Peter Singer - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):264–284.details
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The Argument from Potentiality in the Embryo Protection Debate: Finally “Depotentialized”?Marco Stier & Bettina Schoene-Seifert - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):19-27.details
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Ontological and ethical implications of direct nuclear reprogramming: Response to Magill and neaves.Maureen L. Condic, Patrick Lee & Robert P. George - 2009 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (1):pp. 33-40.details
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(2 other versions)Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ontological and ethical implications of direct nuclear reprogramming.Gerard Magill & William B. Neaves - 2009 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (1):pp. 23-32.details
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Totipotency and the moral status of embryos: New problems for an old argument.William J. FitzPatrick - 2004 - Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1):108–122.details
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