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Several themes of David Lewis's theory of counterfactuals, especially their sensitivity to context, pave the way for a viable theory of nontrivial counterpossibles. If Lewis was successful in defending his account against the early objections, a semantics of counterpossibles can be defended from similar objections in the same way. The resulting theory will be extended to address 'might' counterfactuals and questions about the relative "nearness" of impossible worlds. 

In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: cCurry, the standard conditionalCurry paradox, and vCurry, a validityinvolving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving ccurry. A uniﬁed treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a uniﬁed treatment of both cCurry and vCurry. If, as is often thought, cCurry paradox is to be solved via nonclassical logic, then vCurry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself. 



A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truthvalue gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences. 

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature. 

A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151–182, 1998; Hiddleston, Noûs 39 (4):232–257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317–337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly underexplored, is its relationship to the similaritybased semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, and (...) 

I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism ”. The core of the view is that which proposition is expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another. 

About twentyﬁve years ago, Charles Parsons published a paper that began by asking why we still discuss the Liar Paradox. Today, the question seems all the more apt. In the ensuing years we have seen not only Parsons’ work (1974), but seminal work of Saul Kripke (1975), and a huge number of other important papers. Too many to list. Surely, one of them must have solved it! In a way, most of them have. Most papers on the Liar Paradox offer (...) 

This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaningone which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditionsand shows how the usual multipleconclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical systemSTthat conservatively extends classical (...) 



Reasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an (...) 

Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of language. 

This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists. 

Logicians interested in naive theories of truth or set have proposed logical frameworks in which classical operational rules are retained but structural rules are restricted. One increasingly popular way to do this is by restricting transitivity of entailment. This paper discusses a series of logics in this tradition, in which the transitivity restrictions are effected by a determinacy constraint on assumptions occurring in both the major and minor premises of certain rules. Semantics and proof theory for 3valued, continuumvalued and surrealvalued (...) 

One very popular kind of semantics for subjunctive conditionals is aclosestworlds account along the lines of theories given by David Lewisand Robert Stalnaker. If we could give the same sort of semantics forindicative conditionals, we would have a more unified account of themeaning of ``if ... then ...'' statements, one with manyadvantages for explaining the behaviour of conditional sentences. Such atreatment of indicative conditionals, however, has faced a battery ofobjections. This paper outlines a closestworlds account of indicativeconditionals that does better (...) 



A logic is said to be contraction free if the rule from A→(A→B) to A→B is not truth preserving. It is well known that a logic has to be contraction free for it to support a nontrivial naïve theory of sets or of truth. What is not so well known is that if there is another contracting implication expressible in the language, the logic still cannot support such a naïve theory. A logic is said to be robustly contraction free if (...) 

















A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truthstatus (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/nottrue essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzenstyle presentations of the sequentcalculus. The lesson of the liar is that not all (...) 

We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither settheoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...) 



