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  1. Four-Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
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  • How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. [REVIEW]André Gallois - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):297-300.
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  • How Things Persist.Katherine Hawley - unknown
    The world is remarkably stable -- amidst the flux, physical objects continue to persist. But how do things persist? Are they spread out through time as they are spread out through space? Or is persistence very different from spatial extension? These ancient metaphysical questions are at the forefront of contemporary debate once more. Katherine Hawley provides a wide-ranging yet accessible study of this key issue. She also makes a major contribution to current debates about change, vagueness, and language.
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  • How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties.Penelope Mackie - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    A novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned metaphysicians.
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  • Constitution is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.
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  • Constitution is Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):133-146.
    In his interesting article 'Constitution is not Identity' (1992), Mark Johnston argues that (in a sense soon to be explained) constitution is distinct from identity. In what follows, I dispute Johnston's contention.
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  • The Four-Dimensional World.H. W. Noonan - 1976 - Analysis 37 (1):32-39.
    This paper defends the view of continuants as 'four-dimensional worms' against an argument of Geach's. This is to the effect that if continuants are four-dimensional worms then their stages either do, or do not, fall under the very general terms satisfied by the continuants themselves (a stage of a man either is, or is not, a man); but that either alternative is untenable. I try to show how the former alternative may be defended by appealing to some of Geach's own (...)
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  • Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?Christopher Hughes - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:213-233.
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  • Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.
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  • Hylomorphism.Mark Johnston - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):652-698.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  • Why Constitution is Not Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.
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  • Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
    Precis of my book by this title, for a symposium.
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  • The Paradox of Increase.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):390-417.
    The paradox of increase in an ancient argument purporting to show that nothing can grow by acquiring new parts. If it is sound, similar reasoning leads to the more general conclusion that nothing can ever change its parts. After discussing the implicationsof this principle, the paper lays out the paradox in a way that reveals the premises that figure in it. It emerges that the paradox has no easy solution, and can be resisted only by taking on one of five (...)
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  • Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism: A Reply.J. Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):325-329.
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  • The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter.Kit Fine - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):195-234.
    There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for (...)
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  • Metaphysical Essays.John Hawthorne - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    John Hawthorne is widely regarded as one of the finest philosophers working today. He is perhaps best known for his contributions to metaphysics, and this volume collects his most notable papers in this field. Hawthorne offers original treatments of fundamental topics in philosophy, including identity, ontology, vagueness, and causation. Six of the essays appear here for the first time, and there is a valuable introduction to guide the reader through the selection.
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  • Coincidence and Modal Predicates.P. Mackie - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):21-31.
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  • The Paradox of Increase.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):390-417.
    It seems evident that things sometimes get bigger by acquiring new parts. But there is an ancient argument purporting to show that this is impossible: the paradox of increase or growing argument.i Here is a sketch of the paradox. Suppose we have an object, A, and we want to make it bigger by adding a part, B. That is, we want to bring it about that A first lacks and then has B as a part. Imagine, then, that we conjoin (...)
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  • Persons and Other Beings.Ernest Sosa - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:155.
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  • The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic.Tomis Kapitan - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):166-173.
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  • How Things Persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
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  • Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of realization, (...)
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  • Contingent Identity.Allan Gibbard - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
    Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, in that (...)
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  • Why Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible.Jim Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):329-333.
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  • What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
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  • The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic.Anil Gupta - 1980 - Yale University Press.
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  • Coincidence and Identity.Penelope Mackie - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:151-176.
    This paper is about a puzzle concerning the metaphysics of material objects: a puzzle generated by cases where material objects appear to coincide, sharing all their matter. As is well known, it can be illustrated by the example of a statue. In front of me now, sitting on my desk, is a statue – a statue of a lion. The statue is made of clay. So in front of me now is a piece of clay. But what is the relation (...)
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  • Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Four-Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four-dimensionalism faces. Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four-dimensionalism include novel arguments based on time travel, (...)
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  • Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates.Harold W. Noonan - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):183-193.
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  • Relative Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71.
    Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis.
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  • Why Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible.Jim Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):24-27.
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  • The Non‐identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter.Kit Fine - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):195-234.
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  • How Things Persist.Katherine Hawley - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):613-616.
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  • Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism: A Reply.Jim Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):325–329.
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  • Constitution Is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 44-62.
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  • Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity.David Wiggins - 1967 - Blackwell.
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  • Quantity in Lewisian Metaphysics.John Hawthorne - 2006 - In Metaphysical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 229-237.
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  • Is a Thing Just the Sum of its Parts?Christopher Hughes - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:213-234.
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