Switch to: Citations

References in:

Error Theory in Metaethics

In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 58-71 (2017)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Synthese 84 (1):153-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   376 citations  
  • Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Erik J. Wielenberg draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism, according to which there are objective ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. He goes on to develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.J. L. Mackie - 1977 - Erkenntnis 18 (3):425-430.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   530 citations  
  • Might All Normativity Be Queer?Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
    Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims?including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs?stand or fall together.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   480 citations  
  • Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Sentimental Rules is an ambitious and highly interdisciplinary work, which proposes and defends a new theory about the nature and evolution of moral judgment. In it, philosopher Shaun Nichols develops the theory that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment. Nichols argues that our norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms, and that such 'sentimental rules' enjoy an advantage in cultural evolution, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   166 citations  
  • The Error in the Error Theory.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.
    Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Is Rationality Normative?John Broome - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.
    Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties.Bart Streumer - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336.
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Moral Reality and the End of Desire.Mark de Bretton Platts - 1980 - In Mark Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth, and Reality. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • A Refutation of Morals.John Mackie - 1946 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1-2):77 – 90.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   177 citations  
  • Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):213-219.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.Philippa Foot - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   197 citations  
  • Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1986 - Routledge.
    With a new foreword by Jonathan Lear 'Remarkably lively and enjoyable…It is a very rich book, containing excellent descriptions of a variety of moral theories, and innumerable and often witty observations on topics encountered on the way.' -_ Times Literary Supplement_ Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Drawing on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    It is often claimed that irreducibly normative truths would have unacceptable metaphysical implications, and are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. The book argues, on the basis of a general account of the relevance of ontological questions, that this claim is mistaken. It is also a mistake to think that interpreting normative judgments as beliefs would make it impossible to explain their connection with action. An agent’s acceptance of a normative judgment can explain that agent’s subsequent action because (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  • Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Parsimony and the Argument From Queerness.Justin Morton & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):609-627.
    In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations