Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Colours: Their Nature and Representation.Barry Maund & Jonathan Westphal - 1995. xv + 247 p - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):143-150.
    The world as we experience it is full of colour. This book defends the radical thesis that no physical object has any of the colours we experience it as having. The author provides a unified account of colour that shows why we experience the illusion and why the illusion is not to be dispelled but welcomed. He develops a pluralist framework of colour-concepts in which other, more sophisticated concepts of colour are introduced to supplement the simple concept that is presupposed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.
    Are colors relational or non-relational properties of their bearers? Is red a property that is instantiated by all and only the objects with a certain intrinsic (/non-relational) nature? Or does an object with a particular intrinsic (/non-relational) nature count as red only in virtue of standing in certain relations - for example, only when it looks a certain way to a certain perceiver, or only in certain circumstances of observation? In this paper I shall argue for the view that color (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  • Color as a Secondary Quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   211 citations  
  • On Constraints of Generality.Charles Travis - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1):165-188.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Toward a Projectivist Account of Color.Edward Wilson Averill - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):217-234.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Another Look at Color.Colin McGinn - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):537-53.
    In The Subjective View,' I defended (unoriginally) a dispositional theory of color and drew out some consequences of that theory. The dispositional theory (DT) maintains, roughly speaking, that for an object to instantiate a color property is for it to have a disposition to cause experiences as of an object having that property in normal perceivers in normal conditions. This theory has notable merits in capturing (assuming one wants them captured) the subjectivity and relativity of ascriptions of color, while allowing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   525 citations  
  • The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   531 citations  
  • Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-170.
    A very simple contextualist treatment of a sentence containing an epistemic modal, e.g. a might be F, is that it is true iff for all the contextually salient community knows, a is F. It is widely agreed that the simple theory will not work in some cases, but the counterexamples produced so far seem amenable to a more complicated contextualist theory. We argue, however, that no contextualist theory can capture the evaluations speakers naturally make of sentences containing epistemic modals. If (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   140 citations  
  • Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions About Colours.Jonathan Westphal - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):219-235.
    Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   352 citations  
  • Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
    The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   222 citations  
  • Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):191-194.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   212 citations  
  • Perception and the Fall From Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
    In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   196 citations  
  • Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:181--203.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Seeing Red: The Metaphysics of Colours Without the Physics.Michael Watkins - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):33-52.
    By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of Sydney Shoemaker and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception.Mohan Matthen - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain. Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines; they engage in a process of classification. Human vision sorts and orders external objects in terms of a specialized, proprietary scheme of categories - colours, shapes, speeds and directions of movement, etc. This 'Sensory Classification Thesis' implies that sensation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Problems From Locke.J. L. Mackie - 1976 - Clarendon Press.
    Annotation In this book Mr. Mackie selects for critical discussion six related topic which are prominent in John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding: ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   326 citations  
  • Perception, Common Sense, and Science.Jane English - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):429.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Seeking The Real.Paul Boghossian - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1):223-238.
    A critical discussion of Barry Stroud's claim, in his book "The Quest for Reality", that we could never rationally arrive at the conclusion that, for example, the world is not really colored.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   221 citations  
  • The Obscure Object of Hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
    Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination is thus (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   178 citations  
  • Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 260--290.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • Colours: Their Nature and Representation.J. Barry Maund - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the radical thesis that no physical object has any of the colours we experience it as having.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):3-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Physicalist Theories of Color.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • A Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1993 - In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   126 citations  
  • Putnam’s Paradox.David K. Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   289 citations  
  • Subjectivism and “Unmasking”.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):187-201.
    Barry Stroud’s The Quest for Reality is a fine book that requires and repays several re-readings. Among the book’s many virtues is its appropriate skepticism towards the metaphysical ambition to treat some basic physical science as a fundamental ontology, an exhaustive account of what there is and how it hangs together. When Galileo concluded that mathematics was the key to the labyrinth of nature, he was prepared to treat all qualitative aspects of reality as sensational effects produced in us by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism & the Metaphysics of Colour.Barry Stroud - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Are the things we see around us really colored, or do they only look that way because of the effects of light rays on our eyes and brains? Stroud examines what a person would have to do and believe in order to reach the conclusion that everyone's perceptions and beliefs about the color of things are "illusions" and do not represent the way things actually are in the world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Appearance and Reality: A Philosophical Investigation Into Perception and Perceptual Qualities.PETER M. S. HACKER - 1987 - Philosophy 64 (247):116-119.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Subjectivism and Unmasking.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):187-201.
    Barry Stroud’s The Quest for Reality is a fine book that requires and repays several re-readings. Among the book’s many virtues is its appropriate skepticism towards the metaphysical ambition to treat some basic physical science as a fundamental ontology, an exhaustive account of what there is and how it hangs together. When Galileo concluded that mathematics was the key to the labyrinth of nature, he was prepared to treat all qualitative aspects of reality as sensational effects produced in us by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Ix*-Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions About Colours.Jonathan Westphal - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):235-251.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Statements About Universals.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Mind 86 (343):427-429.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Ways of Coloring.Evan Thompson, A. Palacios & F. J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.
    Different explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  • Singling Out Properties.Stephen Yablo - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:477-502.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts.Edward Wilson Averill & Colin McGinn - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (2):296.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • The Subjective View. Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts.C. Mcginn - 1986 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 48 (2):356-357.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Perception, Common Sense, and Science.J. W. Cornman - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):87-104.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):181-203.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Introduction.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations