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  1. An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation.Ronald N. Giere - 2010 - Synthese 172 (2):269–281.
    I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. (...)
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  • Scientific Fictions as Rules of Inference.Mauricio Suárez - 2009 - In Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. Routledge. pp. 158--178.
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  • Fictions, Inference and Realism.Mauricio Suárez - 2010 - In John Woods (ed.), Fictions and Models: New Essays. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
    Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the (...)
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  • Fictionalism.Arthur Fine - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):1-18.
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  • Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability Without Truth.Eric Winsberg - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):1-19.
    In computer simulations of physical systems, the construction of models is guided, but not determined, by theory. At the same time simulations models are often constructed precisely because data are sparse. They are meant to replace experiments and observations as sources of data about the world; hence they cannot be evaluated simply by being compared to the world. So what can be the source of credibility for simulation models? I argue that the credibility of a simulation model comes not only (...)
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  • How Scientific Models Can Explain.Alisa Bokulich - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):33 - 45.
    Scientific models invariably involve some degree of idealization, abstraction, or nationalization of their target system. Nonetheless, I argue that there are circumstances under which such false models can offer genuine scientific explanations. After reviewing three different proposals in the literature for how models can explain, I shall introduce a more general account of what I call model explanations, which specify the conditions under which models can be counted as explanatory. I shall illustrate this new framework by applying it to the (...)
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  • Cartwright and the Lying Laws of Physics.Ronald Laymon - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (7):353-372.
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  • Cartwright and the Lying Laws of Physics.Ronald Laymon - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (7):353.
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  • How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    In this sequence of philosophical essays about natural science, the author argues that fundamental explanatory laws, the deepest and most admired successes of modern physics, do not in fact describe regularities that exist in nature. Cartwright draws from many real-life examples to propound a novel distinction: that theoretical entities, and the complex and localized laws that describe them, can be interpreted realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theory cannot.
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  • Handshaking Your Way to the Top: Simulation at the Nanoscale.Eric Winsberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):582-594.
    Should philosophers of science be paying attention to developments in "nanoscience"? Undoubtedly, it is too early to tell for sure. The goal of this paper is to take a preliminary look. In particular, I look at the use of computational models in the study of nano-sized solid-state materials. What I find is that there are features of these models that appear on their face to be at odds with some basic philosophical intuitions about the relationships between different theories and between (...)
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  • Simulated Experiments: Methodology for a Virtual World.Winsberg Eric - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):105-125.
    This paper examines the relationship between simulation and experiment. Many discussions of simulation, and indeed the term "numerical experiments," invoke a strong metaphor of experimentation. On the other hand, many simulations begin as attempts to apply scientific theories. This has lead many to characterize simulation as lying between theory and experiment. The aim of the paper is to try to reconcile these two points of viewto understand what methodological and epistemological features simulation has in common with experimentation, while at the (...)
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  • Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization.Mauricio Suárez (ed.) - 2008 - Routledge.
    Science is popularly understood as being an ideal of impartial algorithmic objectivity that provides us with a realistic description of the world down to the last detail. The essays collected in this book—written by some of the leading experts in the field—challenge this popular image right at its heart, taking as their starting point that science trades not only in truth, but in fiction, too. With case studies that range from physics to economics and to biology, _Fictions in Science_ reveals (...)
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  • How We Dapple the World.Paul Teller - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):425-447.
    This essay endorses the conclusion of Sklar’s “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World” that he announces in his abstract, that notwithstanding recent attacks foundational theories are universal in their scope. But Sklar’s rejection of a “pluralist ontology” is questioned. It is concluded that so called “foundational” and “phenomenological” theories are on a much more equal footing as sources of knowledge than Sklar would allow, that “giving an ontology” generally involves dealing in idealizations, and that a transfigured “ficitonalism” provides an (in (...)
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  • An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation.Mauricio Suárez - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):767-779.
    This paper defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. It approaches the notion of representation in a deflationary spirit, and minimally characterizes the concept as it appears in science by means of two necessary conditions: its essential directionality and its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. The conception is defended by showing that it successfully meets the objections that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception captures the objectivity of the cognitive representations (...)
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  • How the Laws of Physics Lie.Malcolm R. Forster - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):478-480.
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  • Using Scott Domains to Explicate the Notions of Approximate and Idealized Data.Ronald Laymon - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):194-221.
    This paper utilizes Scott domains (continuous lattices) to provide a mathematical model for the use of idealized and approximately true data in the testing of scientific theories. Key episodes from the history of science can be understood in terms of this model as attempts to demonstrate that theories are monotonic, that is, yield better predictions when fed better or more realistic data. However, as we show, monotonicity and truth of theories are independent notions. A formal description is given of the (...)
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  • A Function for Fictions: Expanding the Scope of Science.Eric Winsberg - 2009 - In Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. Routledge. pp. 4--179.
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  • Why Scientific Models Should Not Be Regarded as Works of Fiction.Ronald Giere - 2009 - In Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. Routledge. pp. 248--258.
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  • Handshaking Your Way to the Top: Inconsistency and Falsification in Intertheoretic Reduction.Eric Winsberg - 2006 - In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. pp. 73--582.
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