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  1. Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
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  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.John G. Kemeny - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):281-283.
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  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
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  • Philosophical Progress in Language Theory.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (1):2–19.
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  • Responses.W. V. Quine - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):495 – 505.
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  • Three Indeterminacies.W. V. Quine - 1990 - In Barret And Gibson (ed.), Perspectives on Quine. pp. 1--16.
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  • Naturalism; Or, Living Within One's Means.W. V. Quine - 1995 - Dialectica 49 (2‐4):251-263.
    Naturalism holds that there is no higher access to truth than empirically testable hypotheses. Still it does not repudiate untestable hypotheses. They fill out interstices of theory and lead to further hypotheses that are testable.A hypothesis is tested by deducing, from it and a background of accepted theory, some observation categorical that does not follow from the background alone. This categorical, a generalized conditional compounded of two observation sentences, admits in turn of a primitive experimental test.The observation sentences themselves, like (...)
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  • The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - In From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. pp. 47-64.
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  • Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Mind 62 (248):433-451.
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